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Rosen: Public and Private Ownership Rights in Lands Under Navigable Wate

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN
LANDS UNDER NAVIGABLE WATERS: THE
GOVERNMENTAL/PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION
MiCHAEL

L. RosE*

INTRODUCTION

Of all the difficult questions which have arisen in the application of the
law to questions involving water rights, there is none which has produced more uncertainty, caused greater conflict of opinion, or produced more diverse results than that relating to the title to the land
under the waters. This difficulty and diversity of result has arisen from
either failure to perceive clearly the common-law principles applicable,
or a hesitation to apply them for fear of the result.,
Lands covered by water historically have been considered a unique species
of property. 2 Although the law applicable to submerged lands has grown
increasingly sophisticated as property concepts have evolved into a more refined system of divisible rights,3 the extent to which private rights may attach
to such lands has remained dependent upon the water's usefulness for commercial boating, or "navigability." 4 Historically, navigable waters have been
imbued with a public character, while nonnavigable waters have been treated
as ordinary private property. 5
In the United States, however, the simplicity of this general rule is deceptive in two respects. First, determining whether a particular body of water
is navigable can be difficult.6 The inherent vagueness of the concept is comOBA., 1970, Duke University; J.D., 1977, University of Florida.
1. H. FARNHAM, THE IAW OF WATEM AND WATIM RIGHTS 165 (1904).
2. See, e.g., Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Mass.
1979). For a thorough survey and analysis of Roman, French, and Spanish law concerning
submerged lands, see MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law:
HistoricalDevelopment, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water,
3 FLA. ST.U.L. REV. 511, 515-46 (1975).
S. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
4. MacGrady, supra note 2, at 606 (Roman concept of navigability, the capacity to support commercial boating, is followed in England and in American federal courts). A few
American jurisdictions have adopted a more relaxed rule under which waters are deemed
navigable merely by being useful for recreational boating. See infra note 149. Nonetheless,
the prevailing test of navigability for the purpose of determining bed ownership under federal common law and in the overwhelming majority of states requires that waterbodies be
susceptible to use "as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
5. See infra notes 46-55, 146-49, 287 and accompanying text.
6. The Florida Supreme Court recently agreed that the term navigable is "so vague
that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ honestly as to its
application." Odom v. Deltona Corp., 841 So. 2d 977, 987 (Fla. 1976). One commentator

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

plicated because the criteria employed for determining navigability can differ,
depending upon whose rights are being decided 7 and for what purpose.8 If
title to the underlying lands is at issue, the problem is exacerbated by evidentiary obstacles arising from the need to determine the physical characteristics
of the watercourse as it existed when the state entered the Union in order to
establish the state's interestY Second, each legal system since the Romans 0
has recognized distinct and severable classes of interests in lands under navigable waters and formulated special rules for determining to what extent these
interests may be vested in the sovereign for public benefit, 1 possessed exclusively by private persons, or simultaneously divided between them. Due in
part to the influence of those diverse legal systems, American decisions in this
area reflect an inconsistent pattern in the acknowledgement, analysis, and application of governing principles.12
In the contemporary conflict over ownership of submerged lands, encounters between the antagonistic claims of government authorities seeking to
protect public rights and private claimants asserting exclusive ownership have
grown increasingly complex, primarily because there is no longer a consensual
basis for public concerns about the use of navigable waters. A broader sensitivity to environmental considerations has reinforced opposition to private
exploitation of wetlands and stimulated new protest against the use of navigable waters in ways customarily enjoyed by the public.' 3 On the other hand,
the realities of an economy dependent upon rapidly depleting, nonrenewable
has suggested that the concept of navigability may be "so inherently unworkable that it
can no longer be employed as a meaningful standard under which public and private rights
are determined." Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable
Waters, 5 LAND &=WATER L. Rav. 391, 393 (1970).
7. See infra notes 130-31 and text accompanying notes 141-42.
8. See infra note 136.
9. The date is critical because under the federal "equal footing" doctrine, title to the
lands under all waterbodies that were navigable in fact passed by operation of law from
the United States to the newly-formed state as an attribute of sovereignty immediately upon
its admission to statehood. See infra notes 87, 136-42 and accompanying text. One Florida
court characterized as "obvious" the fact that "with the passage of much time and the
many changes which take place with the normal development of most areas of the state it
may be difficult and speculative to attempt to prove or disprove that a particular fresh
water area was 'navigable in fact' in its natural state.
Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341
So. 2d 977, 984 (Fla. 1976).
10. Roman law treated submerged lands as being owned by no one. See, e.g., Sullivan
v. Richardson, 33 Fla. 1, 117, 14 So. 692, 709 (1894); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Micu. L. REy. 471, 475 (1970)
(quoting R. LEE,THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 109-10 (1956)).
11. The benefits of these rights, when held by the sovereign, may accrue to the public
either directly (such as the rights of boating, bathing, and fishing in the waters) or indirectly (such as revenue from leases of submerged land). See Fraser, Title to the Soil Under
Public Waters - The Trust Theory, 2 MINN. L. REv. 429, 434 (1918).
12. "In the United States .... the courts have established a great number of conflicting
rules which are seldom of universal application and which have resulted in much needless
litigation and hardship." H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 171.
13. For example, efforts are being made to restrict the common public right of navigation in certain areas by prohibiting or restricting the operation of motorboats. See Game
g:Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Lake Islands, Ltd., 407 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1981).
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resources has given impetus to a countervailing movement advocating greater
development of previously untapped areas, such as submerged lands, to meet
future needs. In the context of these seemingly irreconcilable yet equally significant objectives, it is increasingly difficult to formulate policies that will best
serve the public interest.
By examining the evolution of the law governing ownership rights in lands
under navigable waters, this article identifies a viable legal theory through
which controversies between public and private claimants can be consistently
and satisfactorily resolved. This theory rests upon recognition of a distinction
between powers that necessarily inhere in the government as protector of the
public rights in navigable waters, and proprietary rights in the underlying
lands which may properly be alienated to private persons. Although English
common law and early American courts recognized this distinction between
governmental powers and proprietary rights, it has been integrated into and
14
obscured by the so-called "public trust" doctrine.
Judicial application of the trust theory, however, has seldom contemplated
the simultaneous enjoyment of both public and private rights. The problem
is attributable primarily to the misconception that the state's authority to
protect public rights is coextensive with, and inseparable from, its title to the
underlying lands. Recent developments in Florida law, however, suggest a
renewed judicial appreciation of the distinction between governmental and
proprietary interests, which may provide a solution that will adequately accommodate both public and private rights.
This article first reviews the historical development of legal principles governing ownership of submerged lands, with emphasis on the common law
origins of the governmental/proprietary distinction and its role in formulating the American public trust doctrine. The second portion of the article
focuses on Florida law, tracing its movement from the original common law
framework, to a strict public trust theory, to reaffirmation of private property
rights. Finally, the prospect for a new analytical framework, derived from a
synthesis of the public trust theory and current concepts of police power, is
explored in light of recent Florida decisions.
HISToRicAL BACKGROUND

Perhaps the most effective means of defining and distinguishing ownership
interests in lands under navigable waters is to view the collective body of
rights as a "bundle of sticks."' 5 From this perspective, the historical develop14. Under the public trust doctrine, the sovereign state is regarded as the owner of all

navigable waters and the underlying lands, which are held in trust for the benefit of all
the people. The object of the trust is to ensure that the public rights of navigation, fishing,

and bathing in the waters are not impaired, except for an overriding public purpose. See,
e.g.,. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing,
56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908).
15. The "bundle-of-sticks" approach to the problem of delineating public and private
.rights in submerged lands has not only been a popular device of legal commentators, see,
e.g., Leighty, supra note 6, at 395 & n.10, but has recently been employed for this very pur1pose by the United States Supreme Court. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
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ment of property rights in submerged lands has proceeded from a single "stick"
under Roman law to an expanding "bundle" of interests in contemporary
American jurisprudence.16 Analysis of this evolutionary process from the early
English common law reveals that despite the tension pervading the struggle
for primacy among public and private interests under American law, proper
recognition of the difference between governmental powers and proprietary
rights refutes the notion that the simultaneous exercise of public and private
1
interests must inevitably result in conflict.'

English Common Law
Prefeudal English property law was uncomplicated: ownership was coextensive with possession, which was acquired and maintained by force of
arms.' In time, however, an orderly scheme of property rights evolved in the
form of the feudal system, whereby the king theoretically held title to all land
and could convey it at his pleasure.' The English sovereign's title to lands
under navigable waters did not arise from a perceived need for a "public
trust" enforceable by the crown; rather, it emerged from the feudal notion
that all property rights emanate from the sovereign and the common law pre-

176 (1979). As one writer has observed in this context: "[I]t must be remembered that ownership is not itself a thing, it is not a fact. It is a useful device, a vessel into which we
may put many things, but it has no independent meaning aside from that which we put
into it." Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638,
639 (1957).
16. It has been suggested that, under current American law, the bundle of rights in
navigable waters "is composed of federal powers exercised under the supremacy clause,
federal proprietary interests, state proprietary interests, state exercises of internal sovereignty,
public rights to surface use, private controls over surface use, and private proprietary interests." Leighty, supra note 6, at 395 n.l0. Of course, each of these specific interests is
merely a broad category that can be further subdivided. For example, public rights in
navigable waters are generally held to include, at a minimum, the use of the waters for
purposes of boating, fishing, and bathing, but any one or more of those distinct usages
may be restricted or altogether prohibited without impairing the others. See Sax, supra
note 10, at 488-89.
17. H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 248.
Such inconsistencies . . . could not arise were the true common-law principles kept
in mind, and they seem to have been caused by the failure, which was so apparent
in early times, to distinguish between property rights and sovereignty. . . . Due regard for the distinction existing between a public right and a public use, and also
those between a servient and proprietary right, is essential to a just consideration
of the rights of parties in a navigable watercourse .... A neglect to observe these distinctions has been the cause of much error in treating of these rights.
Id.
18. See Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN.
L. REv. 313, 316 (1918); see also H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 165.
19. H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 176. Under this theory, all land was held mediately
or immediately from the king. Id. Farnham notes that this theory "was probably not true
in fact, but it was necessary to assume its truth to support the recognized system of land
law." Id.
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cept requiring that all property be owned by someone.2 0 Lands not owned
or occupied by a private individual remained crown property.
In fact, before the emergence of any notion that the public might have
rights in navigable waters, nearly all submerged lands had passed into private
22
ownership.2 ' The only right recognized in such property was the king's, and
there was no question as to his absolute power to convey lands underlying
23
the waters or to grant exclusive rights in the waters themselves. At that time,
rights and governmental powers was faintly
"[t]he distinction between private
24
perceived, if perceived at all."
The notion that absolute crown ownership was subject to public rights had
its genesis in a provision of the Magna Charta, which required the removal
of certain fishing contrivances erected in rivers by persons to whom the king
had granted exclusive fishing rights. 25 Despite a widespread misconception
20. Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325, 336 (1859). The common law required that everything
capable of ownership be assigned an owner. Accordingly, all unoccupied and ungranted
lands, including submerged lands, were considered the property of the king as the original
and universal occupant. Id., citing J. ANGEL., A TREATS ON THE RiGHT OF PROPERTY IN
supra note 1, at 175; Fraser, supra note
TIDE WATERS 19-20 (1826). See also H. FAuNHA,,
11, at 433.
21. Stuart Moore, in his classic treatise, A HsroRY OF THE FORESHORE, observed that the
land grants of the Saxon and Norman kings "extended to the shore of the sea, to the midstream of non-tidal rivers, and in the case of tidal rivers inter fauces terrae, also to the
mid-stream." S. MooRE, A HLsroRy OF THE FoREsHoRE 1 (1888). Consequently, by the end
of the reign of King John in 1216, "the Crown had parted with and granted out almost
." Id at
every manor situate upon the sea-coast and the tidal rivers of the kingdom ..
24. Although these early grants did not expressly include seashore, as they did the beds of
rivers, Moore concludes that such intent was implicit from the boundary descriptions. Id.
at 14. See also H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 181. Inland lakes were dearly under private
ownership and control, as confirmed by the numerous authorities reviewed in Hardin v.
Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 388-99 (1891).
22. The case of Gann v. Free Fishers of Whitstable, .11 Eng. Rep. 1305 (H.L. 1865),
suggests that the ownership of submerged lands did not mean either the king or his grantee
could prohibit or restrict public navigation in the superjacent waters. It does not appear,
however, that there was any legally enforceable navigation right. To the extent such rights
did not "have the law back of them," they could not be considered property rights as
American law views that concept. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
502 (1945).
23. See H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 166:
The King acted on the theory that the whole land was in a certain and profitable
sense his, and he gave it away, bartered it for spiritual benefits, or bestowed it upon
whom he chose in exchange for any consideration which he deemed sufficient. And
there is no doubt that all land under the water which could be profitably used by the
individuals passed into private ownership.
Id. See also supra note 21 and infra text accompanying note 30; Le Strange v. Rowe, 176 Eng.
Rep. 903, 905 (N.P. 1866) (in most instances the king had parted with the right to the foreshore between high and low water mark). It is equally clear that freshwater rivers and lakes
were in private ownership. See, e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 388-89 (1891); Hale De
JureMaris, cap. I (1716), reprinted in S. MOORE, supra note 21, at 370; R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CROwN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SuBJECT IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE REALm

106 (2d ed. 1875).
24. H. FAmRwAm, supra note 1, at 166.
25. As signed by King John at Runnymede in June of 1215, chapter 33 of the Magna
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among American courts, the Magna Charta did not destroy the king's power
to grant exclusive fishing rights, 26 and it certainly did not limit the king's
27
ability to alienate submerged lands.
Nonetheless, the Magna Charta's narrow restriction eventually ripened
into a rule of law that the king's grant of lands under water did not confer
an exclusive right of fishery, but merely a right in common with the general
public.2 8 This early limitation ultimately evolved into the principle that the

sovereign holds the title to lands under navigable waters in two distinct capacities: as the governmental authority charged with the duty to protect the
rights of the public, or jus publicum; and as the proprietary owner of the
subjacent land with the right to grant to individuals any private property
interest, or jus privatum, not destroying or interfering with public rights.2 9
As a practical matter, however, the public enjoyed few rights in navigable
waters after the Magna Charta. Public rights were generally coextensive with
the crown's ownership of the submerged land, but virtually all of the inland
rivers and lakes, as well as most of the seashore, had already passed into private ownership. 0 Consequently, while the right of navigation applied to all
tidally-affected waters regardless of whether the subjacent lands were held by
the king or a private person, the superior property right of the owner restricted
the public's right to use inland nontidal waters for that purpose.3 1 Fishing
Charta provided: "Henceforth all fish-weirs shall be completely removed from the Thames
and Medway and throughout all England except upon the sea coast." See generally J. HOLT,
MAGNA CARTA (1965). The basis for the protest against the king's power to grant fishing
rights was the fact that fishing contrivances placed at the mouths of rivers prevented upstream fishing and interfered with navigation. H. FARNHAM,supra note 1, at 167.
26. This notion apparently originated with Chief Justice Taney's dictum in Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), suggesting that the issue has been settled in England
since the Magna Carta against the right of the king to make such a grant. Id. at 410.
27. The king continued to exercise this authority until modified by an Act of Parliament
in 1702. 1 Anne, ch. 7, § 5. See Fraser, supra note 11, at 434-35. MacGrady, in refuting
Taney's suggestion, observes that "no English court has ever held that [the Magna Charta]
bars the king from alienating submerged land." MacGrady, supra note 2, at 554-55. Nevertheless, state courts perpetuated this error, perhaps because it lent support to the theory
that the public trust doctrine was predicated on common law principles. See, e.g., State v.
Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 91-92, 13 So. 640, 643 (1893).
28. E.g., Malcolmson v. O'Dea, 11 Eng. Rep. 1155 (H.L. 1862). "[A]s the public utility
and necessity of free fishing rights in public waters became more and more manifest, public sentiment became so strong that it became a rule of law that no exclusive fishing rights
of that character could be granted in public waters." H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 167;
see also S. MOORE&& H. MOORE, THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FisHERIEs
13 (1903).
29. See, e.g., Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358
(Mass. 1979).
30. See supra notes 21 & 23. See also S. MOORE, supra note 21, at 169; A. WisooM, THE
LAW OF RIVERS AND WATERCOURSES 22 (4th ed. 1979).
31. See A. WIsDoM, supra note 30, at 58-61. While all tidal waters were technically
viewed as an extension of the sea, and therefore subject to the public right of navigation,
fresh inland waters were regarded strictly as private property, over which an easement for
public passage could be obtained only by prescription, dedication, or statute. Id. at 58-60.
Thus, where such a right was established in a freshwater river, it was "substantially a mere
right to use the river for the purposes of navigation similar to the right the public may
have to passage along a public road or foot path through a private estate." Ewing v.
Colquhoun, L.R. 2 App. Cas. 839 (1877), quoted in H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 239.
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rights remained directly tied to soil ownership,32 so the public's right extended
only to the sea and to those3 limited areas of tidal rivers and shores which
the crown had not conveyed.
This situation persisted until the emergence of the so-called "prima facie"
rule of crown ownership of the tidelands. 4 In De Jure Maris, published in
1786, Sir Matthew Hale adopted the proposition that the tidal shores "doth
prima facie and of common right belong to the king."35 Hale conceded that
the foreshore could be acquired by charter, grant, or usage,3 6 but stressed that
the owner's jus privatum was subject to the jus publicum of navigation.37 Most
importantly, Hale extended the public right of navigation to nontidal waters.38
32. H.

FAmAt
uA,

supra note 1, at 213. This principle, as settled by the Irish case of

The Royal Fishery of the Banne, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1610), has been acknowledged by
American courts. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 396 (1891); Martin v. Waddell, 41

U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,412 (1842).
33. In Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 389 (1891), the Supreme Court reviewed the

English cases and concluded that "[t]he right of public fishery is never mentioned except
in connection with tide-waters where title to the land is in the crown. It is never said
that this right exists in lakes or ponds, or in any other fresh waters." Id.

34. The prima facie rule was originally fabricated without any precedential support
by one Thomas Digges in the mid-sixteenth century as part of a scheme to expand the
crown's property holdings by provoking forfeitures. Digges' treatise, entitled Proofs of the
Queen's Interest in Land Left By the Sea and the Salt Shores Thereof, is discussed and
reprinted in S. MooRE, supra note 21, at 180-211. Digges' prima facie rule postulated that
because the sea is owned by the sovereign as part of the waste and unoccupied lands of
the kingdom, the tidelands and seashores up to the high water mark are presumed to be
owned by the crown unless the private claimant can establish a superior title by proof
of an express grant from the king. Seeking to exploit the fact that private claims to tidelands were usually predicated on prescriptive and possessory rights rather than express
conveyances, see supra note 21, Digges rested his theory on the premise that "evidence of
user and longa possessio avails not to give a title to [the foreshore] unless the grant be
shewn." S. MooRE, supra note 21, at 182. Digges was one of many "title hunters," who
assisted royal commissions of inquiry by investigating a land title, purchasing a patent from
the commission, and proceeding to litigate the claim against the landowner. Id. See also
H. FARNnrAM, supra note 1, at 182; MacGrady, supra note 2, at 559-68. It appears, however,
that Digges' theory was thoroughly rejected by the public, the Parliament, and the courts
at that time. See H. FARNiAM, supra note I, at 182 (claims of the crown "were uniformly
defeated" in the courts); MacGrady, supra note 2, at 561-62 (crown's persistence in asserting claims prompted Parliament to enact a statute of limitations in 1623 to quiet all titles
of over 60 years' duration); 1Z. at 562 (Digges himself "went to court several times . . .
but lost every jury verdict."). See generally S. MOORE, supra note 21, at 212-24.
35. Hale, supra note 23, cap. IV. See MacGrady, supra note 2, at 549. De Jure Maris
has come to be regarded as the most authoritative treatise on English common law water
rights. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894); MacGrady, supra note 2, at 55-51.
36. Hale, supra note 23, cap. VI. This concession undoubtedly reflects acceptance, if
not approval, of the statute of limitations which Parliament established some 44 years
before Hale authored his treatise. See supranote 34.
37. Hale, supra note 23, cap. VI. "[Tjhough the subject may thus have the propriety
of a navigable river part of a port, yet . . . the people have a publick interest, a fus
publicum, of passage and repassage with their goods by water, and must not be obstructed
by nuisances or impeached by exactions...." Id. Unlike the freedom to navigate in tidal
waters, which was absolute, public fishing rights were only presumptive and did not
apply in areas where either the king or an individual had acquired an exclusive right. Id.
at cap. IV and V.
38. Hale decidedly did not treat public navigational rights in freshwater rivers as a
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While acknowledging that inland rivers above the tide were presumed to be
privately owned and subject to exclusive fishing rights,3 9 Hale posited that
fresh rivers used in commerce as common highways, whether private property
or held by the crown, "are prima facie publici juris."'4 By declaring the jus
publicum of free navigation applicable in all waterways, notwithstanding private ownership of the soils, De Jure Maris confirmed that the governmental
power to protect public rights in navigable waters could be exercised independently of any proprietary interest in submerged lands.4 1 The popular appeal
of a rule according fair recognition to both public and private rights undoubtedly hastened the acceptance of Hale's ideas. Acceptance was further assured
since De Jure Maris was published after Parliament had enacted laws protecting the jus publicum by limiting the king's power to alienate submerged
42
lands.
After Hale's theory succeeded as the governing rule,43 the distinction between the king's private property rights, which he could alienate for personal
profit, and the king's governmental powers, which were held in trust for public
benefit, became more pronounced. While the former interest in the submerged lands remained absolutely vested in the crown, as the jus privatum,
Parliament gradually assumed control over the jus publicum.4 At the same
time, the jus publicum came to encompass fishing as well as navigation rights,
45
at least in tidal waters.
The common law of England concerning ownership of submerged lands
therefore came to be predicated on two fundamental distinctions. First, a
locational distinction was drawn between waters affected by the tides, "technically" navigable or navigable at law, and freshwater inland streams and
lakes, including some that were navigable in fact. 4e This distinction governed
mere easement limited to areas where specifically acquired. He flatly asserted that "as the
common highways on the land are for the common land passage, so these [private] rivers,
whether fresh or salt, that bear boats or barges, are highways by water.
Id. at cap. II.
39. Hale, supra note 23, at cap. I.
40. Id. at cap. III.
41. In language reminiscent of the Magna Charta and prescient of modem police power,
Hale characterized the sovereign's authority to enforce navigational rights in private rivers
as "part of the king's jurisdiction . . . to reform and punish nuisances in all rivers." He
added that "all things of publick safety and convenience [are] in a special manner under
the king's care, supervision, and protection." Id. at cap. II.
42. See H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 169-70; Fraser, supra note 11, at 434; MacGrady,
supra note 2, at 555 n.237; Sax, supra note 10, at 476.
43. Hale's version of the prima facie rule was adopted as the correct principle within
nine years after the publication of De Jure Marls in Attorney General v. Richards, 145
Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795), and was "accepted without question by English courts and cited
forever after." MacGrady, supra note 2, at 566.

44. H.

FARNHAM,

supra note 1, at 213.

45. The English courts adhered to the rule that public fishing rights attached only
to "technically" navigable waters (i.e., those affected by the tides). See Murphy v. Ryan,
2 ch. R.C.L. 143 (1868), which rejected the contention that crown ownership and public
fishing rights accompanied the extension of public navigation rights into freshwater rivers.
46. American courts initially accepted the premise that tidality and navigability were
equivalent under English law "because there was no navigable stream in the country beyond the ebb and flow of the tide ..
" The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S.
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prima fade ownership of soil and connected fishing rights.47 The king presumably owned the lands under tidal waters, and therefore .public rights of
navigation and fishing attached. Lands under nontidal waters, regardless of
size, however, were presumed to be the private property of adjoining land48
owners, subject only to the public's right of navigation.
The second distinction, pertaining only to tidelands prima facie owned
by the king, determined which interests in the lands and waters were proprietary interests of the crown subject to alienation by the king's grant, and
which interests were public rights under Parliament's control 4 9 The prevailing English rule allowed the king to grant his proprietary interest for personal profit, but this property, whether held by the king or his grantee, remained subject to the paramount public rights of navigation and fishery,
which could only be conveyed by Parliament. 50 It is therefore dear that under
common law, the government's power to protect public rights in navigable
waters was not diminished by private ownership and enjoyment of all proprietary interests in the underlying lands.5 1
Development of the Trust Doctrine
in America
American courts, and particularly the United States Supreme Court, have
been widely criticized for misconceiving and thereby distorting English common
law rules governing rights in navigable waters.52 This criticism has focused principally upon three interrelated doctrines which, as developed in the United
States, differed from English principles. First, American courts generally have
discarded ownership distinctions based on tidality in favor of a rule that extends sovereign ownership, and thus public rights, to all waters navigable in
fact.5 3 Second, American jurists have changed the prima fade rule, which pre(12 How.) 443, 454 (1851). The Supreme Court subsequently recanted, however, by acknowledging that there are nontidal waterbodies in England which are navigable in fact, though
not considered navigable at law. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1891).
47. See MacGrady, supra note 2, at 587.

48. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 395 (1891) (quoting Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L.
369, 378 (1867)). "As indicated by Murphy v. Ryan, and as made clear in later English cases,
however, the question of riverbed ownership in England remained a question of fact; tidality
was only prima facie evidence of Crown ownership, and the absence of tidality was only
prima facie evidence of private ownership." MacGrady, supra note 2, at 586.
49. See Langdon v. Mayor of N.Y., 93 N.Y. 129, 155 (1883); People v. New York &
S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877).
50. Sax, supra note 10, at 476. See also Langdon v. Mayor of N.Y., 93 N.Y. 129, 155
(1883) ("In England, Parliament had complete and absolute control over all the navigable

waters within the kingdom.").
51. Fraser, supranote 11, at 435.

52. See, e.g., H. FAaHmAM, supra note 1, at 172, 179, 198, 202-07, 245, 248, 253, 260; Fraser,
.supra note 11, at 435-36, 445-46; MacGrady, supra note 2, at 547-52, 568, 571, 575-76, 584-91,
609-12.
53. This principle was first enunciated in Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810),

but widespread acceptance of the notion came only after the Supreme Court abrogated the
tidality distinction for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction in the Propeller Genesee Chief

v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The Court later approved some states' adop-
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sumptively vested title to submerged tidal lands in the crown, into an absolute
rule that the sovereign owns all lands underlying navigable waters.54 Finally,
and most significantly, "[t]he governmental or prerogative power of the English
Crown has inadvertently been transformed into a trust by some of the courts
in the United States," and the jus publicum has, as a consequence of the socalled "public trust doctrine," been expanded "beyond what would be possible
under the common-law theory."55
The first two modifications are consistent with their English common law
heritage, because the theoretical underpinnings of both the tidality distinction and the prima fade rule were inapplicable to the American situation.
Both the feudal system and Hale's prima facie rule were predicated on the
presumption that title to tidelands remained in the crown because few private
claimants could produce evidence of an express grant, but the beds of inland
waterbodies were prima facie regarded as the property of the riparian landowners on the basis of longstanding possession and a presumption that ancient grants conveying those lands had been lost.56 In the colonies, however,
there was no basis for presuming a lost grant.57 Except to the extent that such
grants had actually been issued, the title to all submerged lands both above
and below the tide remained vested in the sovereign, and later the state, as
the original owner. Thus, while American courts rejected the tidality criterion
on the erroneous proposition that there were no navigable waterbodies in
England above the ebb and flow of the tide,58 and the prima facie rule was
simply abandoned without explanation, both developments were entirely
consonant with fundamental common law precepts.
Conversely, the notion that the protection of public rights in all navigable
waters requires the sovereign to hold the underlying lands in an inalienable
public trust is purely an American creation, with no foundation in the English
common law. 59 Although rooted in the common law distinction between the
jus publicum and jus privatum,60 the American public trust doctrine has often
been employed to restrict the sovereign's power of alienation far beyond any
limitation imposed in England. 61 Nonetheless, the public trust doctrine has

tion of factual navigability, rather than technical navigability, as the test for defining
the extent of sovereign ownership. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877).
54. Although the primary impetus for adoption of this modification was the decision
in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), it originated in earlier treatises. J.
ANGELL, supra note 20; 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERIcAN LAW 344-48 (1828).
55. H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 172.
56. See, e.g., MacGrady, supra note 2, at 568.
57. See Fraser, supra note 11, at 429; Note, Power of the State to Convey Title to the
Beds of Fresh-Water Navigable Streams, 28 OR. LAW REv. 385-86 (1949).
58. See supra note 46.
59. MacGrady, supra note 2, at 589-91. See also Fraser, supra note 11, at 435-36.
60. See supra notes 29, 44-45, 49-50 and accompanying text. Fraser, supra note 11, at 436,
points out that the common law theory of original crown ownership of all submerged lands "is
sufficient cause for presuming title to all subaquacous lands in the state, but not for holding
them to be on an inalienable trust. On the contrary, it admits the alienability of the lands,
at least in respect to the jus privatum." Id.

61. H.

FARNHAM,

supra note 1, at 198.
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become the determinative legal basis for defining public and private rights in
lands under navigable waters in this country.
While early American courts differed as to the ownership of lands under
navigable waters, 62 it was universally understood that all proprietary interests
in submerged lands could be freely exercised or conveyed by the owner, subject only, as in England, to public rights of navigation and fishing.63 As the
theoretical successor to both the crown and Parliament, the state could alienate
the entire fee in subaqueous lands, including the jus publicum as well as the
jus privatum.64
The public trust doctrine originated in the 1821 decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Arnold v. Mundy,- and developed into a general
principle of law through several United States Supreme Court cases in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. In Arnold, which involved a fishing
rights claim derived from a royal grant to the provincial governor, the New
Jersey court recognized that submerged lands in England were mostly owned
by private persons, 66 but nonetheless declared that under English common
law, "both the water and the land under the water.., are common to all the
citizens, and.., the property ... is vested in the sovereign .... not for his
own use, but for the use of the citizen."67 The court ruled that the grant from
62. See Shively v. liowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894). The courts even differed as to the
definition of navigability. MacGrady, supra note 2, at 589, 597-605. Two principal lines of
authority surfaced in the state courts after the turn of the century. In Palmer v. Mulligan,
3 Cai.R. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), Chief Justice James Kent held that a non-tidal portion
of the Hudson River was privately owned because "by the rules and authorities of the
common law, every river where the sea does not ebb and flow, was an inland river not
navigable, and belonged to the owners of the adjoining soil." Id. at 318. Thus Kent adopted
the English definition equating navigability with tidality. Although he erred in suggesting
that ownership of the bed was an absolute rule of law, rather than a factual question
aided by a presumption, Kent significantly recognized that even as to lands owned by the
sovereign, "the absolute proprietary interest . . . may, by grant or prescription, become
private property." 3 J. KFNT, COMMENTARIES ON AMmucAN LAv 344 (1828). For a compilation of states following Kent's modified common law rule, see H. FAAMnr, supra note 1,
at 249-53.
The second line of authority originated five years after Palmer when the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Carson v. Blazer, B. Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810y, rejected the English common
law distinction between tidal and fresh waters as unreasonable, and held that the beds of
all rivers navigable in fact are owned by the state. Although this rule ultimately prevailed
over the English common law principles in the'majority of states, see H. FARNHAM, supra
note 1, at 254-56, and in federal law, see supra note -53, the continuing influence of Palmer
is reflected in the numerous decisions holding major American rivers to be in private ownership. See H. FARNHAxM, supra note 1, at 249-51 nn.4, 9, 10 & 12. A notable example is Middieton v.-Pritchard, 4 Ill.
498, 3 Scam. 510 (1842) (holding the Mississippi River above the
tide to be privately owned).
63. H.,FAIRUu, supra note 1, at 229-a1.
64. "In this country, the State has succeeded to all the rights of both crown and Parliament in the navigable waters and the soil under them, and here the jus privatum and the
jus publicum are both vested in the State." Langdon v. Mayor of N.Y., 93 N.Y. 129, 155
(1883). See also H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 260.
65. 6. N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821).
66. Id. at 73.
67. Id. at 76. Ironically, this wholly fabricated statement of law was prefaced in the
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King Charles II to the governor of the province did not convey any proprietary rights in navigable waters and the underlying lands, but only the governmental power to protect the public's rights. Significantly, the court concluded
that the governor's subsequent grant could not convey any exclusive rights of
fishery because the proprietary and governmental rights were inseparable, and
remained so after they became vested in the state following the Revolution.Gs
This principle, purely an invention of the Arnold court, laid the foundation
from which the Supreme Court would ultimately develop the concept of an
inalienable public trust.
United States Supreme Court Decisions
Under the unique system of dual sovereignty that developed in the United
States, it has often been difficult to determine how the bundle of sticks comprising the totality of interests in submerged lands should be divided among
the federal government, state governments, and private parties. The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that state law governs ownership
rights in lands under the navigable waters. 69 Yet it has frequently formulated
rules that were perceived, if not intended, 0 as controlling precedent by state
court judges.
The first major Supreme Court decision on rights in lands under navigable
waters, Martinv. WaddellJ presented a dispute over oyster fishing rights in the
New Jersey coastal waters. King Charles II had granted certain charters conveying territory in the colonies to the Duke of York, who in turn sold his
interests in the properties to a group of "proprietors." 72 As the result of a
subsequent dispute between these proprietors and British authorities, the
proprietors "surrendered to the crown all the powers of government, retaining
their rights of private property." 73 One of the proprietors thereafter conveyed
his retained proprietary rights to Waddell, who successfully maintained an
action for ejectment in the New Jersey courts against persons claiming title
under a state statute. Predictably, the Supreme Court relied on Arnold as
New Jersey authority for deciding against Waddell's claim of private fishing
4
rights.
opinion by an express apology from its author, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick, for not having
researched the question of the proprietors' right to convey title "in so full and satisfactory
a manner as could have been wished." 6 N.J.L. at 69-70.
68. For a more thorough discussion of Kirkpatrick's opinion in Arnold v. Mundy, see
H. FARNHAM,supra note 1, at 203-05; MacGrady, supra note 2, at 590-91.
69. E.g., Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
371-81 (1977); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 601, 669 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324,
338 (1877).
70. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 31 (1894) (stating that the Court's decisions
regarding lands under navigable waters "should be considered with reference to the facts
upon which they were made, and keeping in mind the local laws of the different states..71. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1812).
72. Id. at 407.
73. Id.
74. The irony is compounded in two respects. First, the majority characterized Arnold

as having been decided "with gTeat deliberation and research," id. at 418, despite the fact
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Viewed narrowly, the majority opinion in Waddel held only that the
words of conveyance in the king's original grant were insufficient to evince
an intent to confer private fishing rights apart from the common right inherently connected with the governmental powers.75 The Court sought to
bolster this conclusion, however, by reasoning that although the king unquestionably had the right to make the grant, the "dominion and property in
navigable waters, and the lands under them," were "held by the king as a
public trust... for the 'benefit and advantage of the whole community"7 6 The
next question was whether this trust impaired the power of the king to convey private property rights in the submerged lands apart from the "prerogative powers of government." At this point, the majority was confronted with
common law authority that was irreconcilable with the novel public trust
concept.7 7 It was essential to the result that the king's grant be held not to
have conveyed the private rights claimed by Waddell, but instead that the
state statute, which granted similar private rights to the other parties, be
sustained.
The Court ingenuously solved this dilemma by entirely avoiding the question of whether the crown had the power to sever proprietary interests in the
lands from the governmental interests, ruling that even if such a conveyance
were permissible,"5 the language of this particular grant was insufficiently
definite to sustain such an intention. 9 Recognizing the lack of any foundation
for the trust doctrine in English law and the weakness of this rationale, the
majority downplayed the question of the king's power by positing that the
that Arnold's author expressly apologized for not having adequately investigated or considered the subject. 6 NJ.L. at 69-70. Second, the Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme
Court, which apparently either did not consider its own prior decision in Arnold as controlling precedent, or did not read Arnold to require the result reached by the Court.
75. Although the charter expressly conveyed "all the estate, right, title, interest, benefit, and advantage, claim and demand of the king, in the said land and premises," 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) at 408, the Court observed that if the king had intended to sever and 'divest the
proprietary rights it "would not have been left for inference from ambiguous language."
Id. at 416.
76. Id. at 41-1. For a discussion of the distinction between dominium and imperium,
see Leighty, supra note 6, at 408-09.
77. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.
78. Justice Taney vacillated on this question throughout the majority opinion. Ultimately, he suggested that some grants of private rights in navigable waterbodies were valid
in England, subject to the rule that "whatever does not pass by the grant, still remains in
the crown for the benefit and advantage of the whole community." Id. at 411. On the other
hand, he concluded that different rules governed the king's charter to the duke covering
large areas in the colonies, because it was not an ordinary deed of private property, but
"was an instrument upon which was to be founded the institutions of a great political
community." Id. at 411-12. The underlying notion that the magnitude and purpose of
a grant may have some bearing on its validity has been perpetuated as an integral facet
of the public trust concept. See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
452-53 (1892); State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 853, 356-57 (1908).
79. On the theory that a royal grant of exclusive private rights in navigable waters
would be in derogation of the public trust, Justice Taney opined that any such conveyance
must be "construed strictly -and it will not be presumed that [the king] intended to part

from any portion of the public domain, unless clear and especial words are used to denote
it." 41 U.S4 at 411.
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crown's proprietary rights and Parliament's governmental powers had been
reunited in the states upon independence," ° and therefore grants made by the
states were not governed by the same principles that applied to grants by
the crown."'
The fundamental analytical fallacy in Waddell was the Court's adoption
of Arnold's notion that the crown's proprietary interests in lands under navigable waters8 2 could not be severed from the governmental power without
violating the public trust.8 3 Although the majority did not expressly decide
this point, but merely suggested it as a basis for holding that the king's grant
was not intended to confer private fishing rights, many judges would later
consider the dictum to be a central feature of the opinion.8 4 The Court's result implicitly confirmed the power of the states, as successors to both the crown
and Parliament, to alienate proprietary rights in submerged lands.8 5
Waddell established that upon independence from Britain the entire bundle
of sticks representing interests in and power over the submerged lands passed
directly to each original state, excepting only those powers surrendered by the
state of the federal government. The federal government never held nor conveyed any proprietary rights in the lands under navigable water in the original
colonies. The extent of federal authority over submerged lands in subsequentlyadmitted states was decided in Pollardv. Hagans" in which the Supreme Court
held that states entering the Union after independence acquired absolute ownership of their navigable waters and underlying lands on an equal footing with
the original states 87 By ruling that the federal government exercised sovereignty over a territory prior to statehood only as a trustee for the future
state,88 and that a post-statehood federal patent of lands under navigable
waters was ineffective to convey a title which had already passed to the state

80. Id. at 416. As Justice Taney explained, "when the Revolution took place the people of each State became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right
Id.
.
to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use ...
at 410 (emphasis added). See also supra note 64.
81. 41 U.S. at 410.
82. It is important to keep in mind the Court had not yet extended the meaning of
navigable waters to include inland rivers and lakes, and would not do so until The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
83. See Fraser, supra note 11, at 437.
84. See H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 202; Fraser, supra note 11, at 436-38; MacGrady,
supra note 2, at 589-91. Justice Thompson's dissent may be largely responsible for this development. He was so thoroughly persuaded the words of the charter were sufficient to pass
title that he felt the majoritys result "must rest on the ground that the land under the
" 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 419
water of a navigable river is not the subject of private right ....
(Thompson, J., dissenting).
85. Justice Thompson's dissenting opinion demonstrates that Justice Taney implicitly
'upheld New Jersey's right to do by statute what the king was deemed powerless to do. Id.
at 420-21.
86. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
87. Id. at 223-24, 228-30.
88. Id. at 222-23. The federal government had authority to convey lands under navigable waters in a territory before statehood, but rarely did so. See infra notes 131, 138 and
accompanying text.
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by operation of law, 9 the Pollard Court settled for all time that the entire
bundle of sticks in navigable waters, other than the power to regulate commerce reserved to the United States under the Constitution, 0 is vested in the
states.
Although Waddell and Pollard were decided when the term "navigable
waters" was limited to tidewaters, 91 the Court subsequently concluded in
Barney v. Keokuk 92 that those decisions "enunciate principles which are equally
applicable to all navigable waters." 93 This decision was dearly a departure
from the precedents of those states which had adopted and applied the English
common law.94 In recognition of this problem, the Court confirmed that the
states had not only acquired both the governmental and proprietary interests in
submerged lands, but also the power to decide how those interests should be divided between the state and private individuals. 9 It did so, however, in terms
that strongly encouraged the states to abrogate the common law rule recognizing riparian ownership of nontidal waters as being "at variance with sound
principles of public policy."9 6
The policy basis for the Barney Court's suggestion that state ownership
should apply to all waters navigable in fact was "that the public authorities
ought to have entire control of the great passage ways of commerce and navigation, to be exercised for the public advantage and convenience."9 7 As a
practical matter, the intimation that the governmental power to protect public
navigational rights could not be exercised independently of bed ownership
effectively eviscerated the concept that the states are free to formulate their
own rules governing rights in subaqueous lands. This inseverability notion
did not comport with the English common law, under which the 'uspublicum
of navigation and fishery protected by Parliament had for centuries coexisted
in harmony with private individuals' enjoyment of the 'us privatum.8 Moreover, the theory was wholly inconsistent with the practices of the states, most
of which were indiscriminately selling their lands to the highest bidder or
granting them wholesale into private ownership for some perceived public
purpose. 99
The tension that grew out of these fundamental inconsistencies reached a
pinnacle in Hardin v. Jordan,100 and was ultimately resolved in Illinois Cen89. Id. at 20.
90. U.S. CONsr.art. L § 8, cl. 3.

91. See supra note 82.
92. 94 US.324 (1877).
93. Id. at 338.
94. See supra note 62.

95. 94 U.S. at 338.
96. Id.
97. Id.
at 433-36.
98. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 1%1,
99. For a concise, but startling, summary of some early state land sales in Florida, see
Note, Florida's Sovereignty Submerged Lands: What Are They, Who Owns Them and
Where Is the Boundary?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 596, 604 n51 (1973). Sax, supra note 10, at
524-28, chronicles the California experience. See also H. FA NsAM, supra note 1,at 244.

100. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
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tral Railroad Co. v. Illinois.-1 Hardin represents a transition in the Court's
development of its philosophy concerning alienability of interests in submerged
lands. The Court implicitly acknowledged that the concept of inseverable
proprietary and governmental interests was an inaccurate reflection of both
English lawlol and the American experience. 103 More importantly, the Court
conceded that a state may, by operation of law or otherwise, alienate ownership rights in lands under waters that are navigable in fact. 04 By qualifying
this position with the caveat that such grants reserve to the state "those rights
of eminent domain over the waters and the land covered thereby which are
inseparable from sovereignty,"''1° the Court confirmed that the government
retains authority to protect the public navigational easement even in waters
not regarded as navigable in law for state ownership purposes. 10 6 Thus, while
Hardin reaffirmed the general principle that states have the power to decide
how the bundle of sticks shall be apportioned, it retreated from the notion
that governmental control is inseparable from bed ownership. 0 7 The Court
instead moved toward the opposite extreme by approving the common law
rule recognizing virtually absolute alienability of proprietary interests in
submerged lands. 08
The Court finally settled on a middle ground in its "polestar" decision
on the public trust doctrine, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.108 In
Illinois Central, the Court was squarely confronted with a dispute over the
validity of a state legislative act granting lands under navigable waters to a
101. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
102. The Court recognized that "[s]treams above tide-water, although navigable in
fact at all times, or in freshets, were not deemed navigable in law," and that "[t]o these,
riparian proprietors... could acquire exclusive ownership in the soil, water and fishery....
subject, however, to the public easement of navigation." 140 U.S. at 384 (quoting Middleton v. Pritchard, 4 111.
498, 3 Scam. 510 (1842)). The majority extensively discussed English
law in confirming this principle, id. at 388-92, and concluded that all cases holding nontidal waters to be subject to any public rights other than navigation represented a departure from the common law. Id. at 395.
103. 140 U.S. at 382.
104. Id. at 383. The Hardin Court held that a federal patent of riparian lands up to
the ordinary high water line of a freshwater lake effectively carried title to the lake's contiguous bed pursuant to Illinois law. The majority therefore reaffirmed the principle of
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877), by declaring that "it depends on the law of each State
to what waters and to what extent this prerogative of the State over the lands under water
shall be exercised." 140 U.S. at 382.
105. 140 U.S. at 383. It is clear that Justice Bradley was not using the term "eminent
domain" merely in the sense of power to condemn, but intended the broader meaning
that encompasses all governmental powers. See P. NICHOLs, NIcHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 2425 (2d ed. 1917).
106. Although Hardin dealt only with acquisition of private ownership rights in lands
under non-tidal waters, the Court had previously indicated that the navigational servitude
was the only limitation upon the state's power to alienate tidelands. Weber v. Board of
St. Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65-66 (1873).
107. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877), discussed supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
108. Indeed, the Hardin Court condemned a lower federal court for departing from
the common law rule. 140 U.S. at 397.
109. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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private railroad company. 10 The statute, which originally conveyed most
of Chicago harbor's submerged lands,:", was later repealed by the Illinois
Legislature; thereafter, the Illinois attorney general obtained a judicial de12
termination that title was in the state rather than the railroad company.
Since the railroad's activities in the harbor had caused no actual interference
a pure question of law as
with commercial navigation, 13 the case presented
4
to the validity of the state's original grant."
The Court initially emphasized that the statute's express provisions prohibiting the railroad from conveying its interests to third parties or interfering
with navigation in the harbor did not actually diminish the absolute nature
of the grant." 5 Moreover, the observation that these restrictions in the grant
"placed no impediments upon the action of the railroad company which did
not previously exist"" 6 seemed to confirm that there is an implicit reservation
of state power to protect the public navigational easement in grants of lands
under navigable waters. Paradoxically, however, the majority framed the critical issue as "whether the Legislature was competent to thus deprive the State
of its ownership of the submerged lands in the harbor of Chicago, and of the
consequent control of its waters ... ."7 Thus, the Court lapsed into the misconception that ownership of the underlying lands necessarily encompasses
control of the superjacent water,""' while simultaneously acknowledging that
the state's power to protect the public navigational servitude is not affected
by a grant of submerged lands. It was from this confusion that the model
statement of the public trust doctrine in this country emerged.
The Court first characterized the state's title to lands under navigable
waters as "held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of
fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.""19
110. Enacted by the Illinois Legislature in 1869, the act was a grant of the fee in perpetuity conditioned upon the railroad not obstructing the Chicago harbor, impairing navigation, or alienating the lands. Id. at 448-49.
LJl. Id. at 451. The majority made no attempt to conceal its feeling that a grant of
this magnitude constituted an egregious abuse of legislative power. Id. at 454-55.
112. Although the repealing act was adopted in 1873, exactly four years after the original enactment, id. at 448-49, the state did not bring suit to confirm its title until 1883.
Id. at 433.
113. Id. at 443-44.
114. The Court could not evade the issue, as Justice Taney had in Waddell, because
it was clear that the "object [of the act] was to grant to the railroad company submerged

lands in the harbor." Id. at 449.
115. Construing the limitations contained in the act, the majority emphasized that the
railroad's ability to make a lease for any period and to renew it at its pleasure rendered
:he prohibition against conveyances inconsequential. Id. at 451.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
118. In a later portion of the opinion, Justice Field concluded a brief analysis of
Arnold by observing that the state necessarily forfeits control of navigable waters when it
alienates the subjacent lands. Id. at 456.
119. Id. at 452. Sax, supra note 10, at 490, refers to this statement as "the central substantive thought in public trust litigation." He explains the public trust principle, the underlying basis for which was not articulated by the Court, as an outgrowth of the philosophy
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Defining the extent to which submerged lands could be alienated without
violating the trust, the majority did not interpret the trust doctrine as an
absolute prohibition against alienation of submerged lands. 20 The Court
merely held that a state could not abdicate its governmental authority to
control public navigational use of an entire waterway. 2 Likening this trust
responsibility to state police powers, the Court concluded that such trusts
"cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the State." 122
Illinois Central therefore treats the power of the state to alienate interests in land under navigable waters as a matter of degree."' At one extreme,

an attempted conveyance of an entire commercial harbor to a private corporation is tantamount to a per se abuse of legislative authority. 24 At the other
extreme, portions of submerged lands that can be occupied and used by private interests without impairing public easements cannot only be alienated
by the state, but can be totally separated from the trust"25 and dealt with as
that a government's function is to serve the whole public, and that it should not ordinarily
confer benefits on particular groups or individuals. Id.
120. The Illinois Central majority broadly delineated the contours of the doctrine:
It is grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters, that may afford foundation
for . . .structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels which, being occupied,
do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and water remaining,
that are chiefly considered and sustained . . . as a valid exercise of legislative power
consistently with the trust to the public upon which such lands are held by the State.
But . . . the abdication of the general control of the State over lands under the
navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake . . .is not consistent
with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State to preserve
such waters for the use of the public.
146 U.S. at 452-53.
121. See id. See also Sax, supranote 10, at 489.
122. 146 U.S. at 453-54. Conceding that it could not "cite any authority where a grant
of this kind has been held invalid," the majority predicated the conclusion solely on its
judgment that a legislature's authority to make such a grant "is hardly conceivable" and
"would not be listened to." Id. at 454-55. See supra note 111.
123. See generally Note, Conveyances of Sovereign Lands Under the Public Trust Doctrine: When Are They in the Public Interest, 24 U. FLA. L. RV. 285, 289-90 (1972).
124. 146 U.S. at 453. Such a grant "would be held, if not absolutely void on its
face, as subject to revocation." Id. The Court's position on the nature of the defect in such
a grant is problematical. After explaining that the legislature could not alienate its inherent
governmental power and duty, the majority held the original act granting the submerged
lands "was inoperative," and then stated that the act "was annulled by the repealing act."
It is therefore unclear whether the attorney general (or a citizen) could have avoided the
original grant if the legislature had not expressly repealed the act, and whether such a
legislative grant vested any compensable rights in the private grantee that were not perpetually subject to subsequent legislative repeal. Since the repealing act followed the grant
by only four years in Illinois Central, it is perhaps not surprising that the Court reached
its result without considering the full ramifications of some imprecise language on this
point.
125. The Illinois Central Court noted that
[tjhe control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as
to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can
be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands
and water remaining.
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ordinary property subject to any lawful use. Between these extremes, the
state may transfer lands, but may not relinquish the trust responsibility for
assuring that public easements in the waters are free from private inter26
ference.1
The Court's result in Illinois Central reflected an inclination to favor state
ownership over private rights, but its rationale represented a compromise. In
an effort to satisfy the state's objectives, the majority sought to fashion a result
which would enable the legislature to invalidate the grant to, the railroad
company, while at the same time permitting subsequent state sales or dispositions of the same lands.22 7 Consequently, the Court was forced to create a
broad rule that would accommodate essentially contradictory claims, thereby
further displacing common law principles with a uniquely American doctrine.
In effect, Illinois Central confirms the state's absolute power to control
the disposition of submerged lands by holding that the state could revoke its
own grant and regain ownership when necessary to protect public interests. 18
Yet the Court simultaneously reaffirmed the right of the state to dispose of
submerged lands in any manner not contrary to the public interest. To that
extent, the public trust doctrine constitutes little more than an expression of
the common law principle that the sovereign may grant the jus privatum in
submerged lands, but these proprietary rights remain subservient to the jus
publicum in the superjacent waters. 29
Following the crystallization of the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central,
federal law concerning ownership interests in lands under navigable waters
settled into a discernible pattern. Once it is determined that title to a body
of water passed from the federal government to the state, state law generally
governs the disposition of such property, 30 subject to the qualification that the
Id. at 453 (emphasis added). See also id. at 455-56.
126. 146 U.S. at 458.
127. The state's complaint forced the Court to take a conciliatory position by alleging that "the claims of the defendants are a great and irreparable injury to the State of
Illinois as a proprietor and owner of the bed of the lake ... preventing an advantageous
sale or other disposition thereof," and by requesting that the state "be declared to have
the sole and exclusive right... to dispose of such rights at its pleasure." Id. at 466 (Shiras,
J., dissenting) (quoting the State of Illinois' complaint (emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 460-61.
129. Indeed, the Court would later hold that Illinois Central did not preclude the
state from parting with both the jus privatum and the fus publicum, so long as the contemplated use could be justified as beneficial, or at least not injurious, to the public. See
Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364, 393-98 (1926).
130. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 372-81
(1977); Archer v. Greenville Sand & Gravel Co., 233 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1914). The application of federal navigable waters law for the purpose of deciding land titles has been restricted to three types of controversies warranting a uniform federal standard: (1)boundary
disputes between two states having their common border on a navigable stream, e.g., Arkansas
v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 175-76 (1918); (2) claims involving Indian tribal lands, e.g.,
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1979); and (3) ownership contests
between the United States and a state as to whether particular lands passed to the state
under the equal footing doctrine, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); United
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931). The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently confirmed that an ownership dispute between the
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state may not impair rights acquired through pre-statehood federal grants. 131
Accordingly, to determine the extent of private proprietary interests that may
exist in a particular parcel of submerged land, the law of the property's situs
must be consulted.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN FLORIDA'S
SOVEREIGNTY LANDS

Because the public trust is a uniquely American judicial doctrine, it should
not be surprising that the principles were not simultaneously adopted nor
uniformly applied in each state. The concept was not only foreign to the
English common law from which most state courts sought guidance, but it also
conflicted with the designs of many state legislatures. Lawmakers typically
viewed submerged land as a worthless incident of statehood that could be
readily converted into a revenue-producing windfall by conveying the land
to private parties.132 Consequently, judges have been confronted with the difficult task of reconciling the trust theory with legislative acts purporting to
alienate the state's interests into private ownership.

Florida courts have resolved this dilemma by imparting a measure of flexibility to both the theory and its practical application. On a theoretical level,
the courts have treated the public trust doctrine not as an absolute prohibition against alienation of lands under navigable waters, called "sovereignty
lands" because of the manner in which they were acquired, 33 but as a conceptual merger of the common law jus publicum and jus privatum. This approach
permits the state to alienate submerged lands, or proprietary interests in such
lands, to any extent that does not interfere with public rights in the use of
the waters. Such lands or interests, once conveyed or divested, are owned by
State of Florida and a private company, involving the issues of whether certain lands were
beneath navigable waters at the time of statehood and therefore passed to the state under
the equal footing doctrine, did not present a federal jurisdictional question. Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.LW. - (U.S. Nov. 1,
1982) (No. 82-379.
131. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 58 (1894). Of course, whether the submerged lands are held by the state or individual
owners, their rights remain subject to the paramount authority of the United States to
preserve and regulate the federal "navigational servitude" in all naturally occurring or
publicly-created navigable waterways. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1926); Scranton v. Wheeler, 170 U.S.
141, 163 (1900). For a discussion of the federal navigational servitude, see Munro, The
Navigational Servitude and the Severance Doctrine, 6 LAND & WATR L. REV. 491 (1971);
Comment, Kaiser Aetna: Supreme Court Scuttles Federal Dominion Over Navigable Waters,
Unsettles Takings Law, 10 ENVr'L L. REP. 10028 (1980). Parallel state law doctrines are
surveyed in Comment, The State Navigation Servitude, 4 LAND & WATER L. Rav. 521 (1969),
in which the author suggests that "Florida's navigation law could present American jurisprudence with one jurisdiction which has no navigation servitude at all." Id. at 524-25 n.22.
132. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Courts have frequently agreed that at
least some portions of the submerged lands are "for all practical purposes worthless," Tampa
X'.R.R. v. Tampa, 104 Fla. 481, 485, 150 So. 311, 313 (1932), and have openly endorsed
legislative acts permitting the sale of such lands to private interests. Caples v. Taliaferro,
144 Fla. 1, 197 So. 861, 863 (1940).
133. E.g., Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 563-64, 112 So. 274, 283 (1927).
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the private grantee, but may remain subject to some public rights so long as
the lands are covered by water. 3 4 In practical application, Florida courts tend
to gauge the severability of particular lands or interests on a sliding scale,
whereby susceptibility to private ownership is balanced against the actual need
to preserve the waters for public use. 35 By this approach, Florida courts. have
acknowledged that, in effect, some sovereignty lands are "more sovereign"
than others. Before analyzing the development of Florida- law on the alienability of interests in sovereignty lands, however, a brief examination of how
Florida defines sovereignty lands will facilitate comprehension of the rules
governing their disposition.
The Source and Extent of Floridds

Title to Sovereign Lands
Upon attaining statehood in 1845, Florida assumed sovereignty over the
navigable waters within the state, 36 including title to the underlying lands
up to the ordinary high water mark.137 Because sovereignty lands passed to
the state 38 through operation of law under the equal footing doctrine, 39 and
134. See State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 113-14, 13 So. 640, 650 (1893).
See also City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 37-38, 476 P.2d
423, 437-38 (1970) (the common law public trust does not forbid alienation of sovereignty
lands but ensures that when sovereignty lands are alienated they remain subject to the trust).
135. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. Florida courts have held that the public
trust doctrine does not go so far as to require that all submerged lands be kept in their
natural state. Sarasota County Anglers-Club, Inc. v. Burns, 193 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. Ist D.C.A.
1967).
136. Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 62 Fla. 549, 558-59, 57 So. 428, 431 (1912). Simultaneously with its admission to statehood in 1845, Florida also received from the federal
government 500,000 acres of land for the general purpose of internal improvements, Act of
March 3,1845, ch. XLVIII, 5 Stat. 742, and other public lands for a seat of government and
for school purposes. Act of June 3,1845, ch. LXXV, 5 Stat. 788.
137. State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 106, 13 So. 640, 648 (1893). See also
Thiesen v. Gulf F. & A. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 57, 78 So. 491, 500 (1918) (on rehearing); State
ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 608-13, 47 So. 353, 355-57 (1908). For tidal waters, this
reference point is the "mean high water line.' See generally Gay, The High Water Mark:
Boundary Between Public and Private Lands, 18 U. FLA. L. RV. 553 (1966). Some states
extended sovereign title only to the low water mark. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246
U.S. 158, 176 (1918). By adopting the ordinary high water line standard, Florida extended its
title to the limits of what federal law regarded as having passed under the equal footing
doctrine. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877).
138. Because the Florida territory was under the sovereignty of Spain until 1819 and of
the United States until statehood, some parcels of submerged lands which had been expressly conveyed into private ownership by the Spanish or federal governments during the
periods of their respective sovereignties did not become the property of Florida. See State v.
Black River Phosphate Co., 27 Fla. 276, 328, 9 So. 205, 208 (1891). Although the Florida
Supreme Court suggested in an early decision that the federal government was powerless to
grant submerged lands while Florida was in a territorial status, State v. Black River Phosphate
Co., 32 Fla. 82, 94, 13 So. 640, 644 (1893), it later conceded federal authority as recognized in
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). For an example of a valid pre-statehood federal grant
of lands under navigable waters to a private individual in Florida, see Silver Springs Paradise
Co. v. Ray, 50 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1931). Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged
pre-1819 Spanish grants, but adopted such a strict rule of construction that even those grants
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not by express grant, there was no specific designation of those lands considered
to be under navigable waters. 140 Since the federal classification of lands was
relevant only to define the means by which title passed out of the United
States, 141 it remained for Florida to formulate its own rules for determining
which lands were sovereignty lands, which were to be dealt with as swamp
and overflowed lands, and what legal distinctions, if any, were to apply be42
tween the two categories.1
Early Florida decisions faithfully applied English common law principles
governing ownership of lands under navigable waters, including the rule of
riparian ownership of lands under nontidal waterbodies.1 3 Although the federal courts had already endorsed the American rule recognizing state ownership of all waterbodies navigable in fact, 4 4 the Florida Supreme Court did
which had been confirmed and approved by the federal authorities were found to be lacking
the precise language demanded as evidence of an express intent to convey submerged lands.
See Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 436-59, 98 So. 505, 519-26 (1923);
Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 563-68, 82 So. 221, 227-28 (1919); Sullivan v. Richardson, 33
Fla. 1, 113-30, 14 So. 692, 708-13 (1894).
139. See, e.g., State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 93-94, 13 So. 640, 644 (1893).
The Supreme Court enunciated the doctrine that same year in Pollard v. Hagan, discussed
supra notes 86-90.
140. United States v. 2899.17 Acres of Land, 269 F. Supp. 903, 907-08 (M.D. Fla. 1967).
This uncertainty was complicated by the subsequent federal grant to the state in 1850 of
swamp and overflowed lands, which included the beds of nonnavigable waterbodies as well as
uplands which bordered on the navigable rivers, lakes, and tidal waters. Act of Sept. 28, 1850,
ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 (codified at 453U.S.C. §§ 981-94 (1976)). E.g., Pierce v. Warren, 47 So. 2d
857, 858 (Fla. 1950); Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 565-66, 112 So. 274, 284 (1927). See also
State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 606, 615-16, 47 So. 353, 354, 357 (1908), which defined
swamp and overflowed lands as follows:
Within the meaning of this act of Congress, swamp lands, as distinguished from overflowed lands, are such as require drainage to dispose of needless water or moisture on
or in the lands, in order to make them fit for successful and useful cultivation. Overflowed lands are those that are covered by nonnavigable waters, or are subject to such
periodical or frequent overflows of water, salt or fresh (not including lands between
high and low water marks of navigable streams or bodies of water, nor lands covered
and uncovered by the ordinary daily ebb and flow of normal tides of navigable waters),
as to require drainage or levees or embankments to keep out the water and thereby
render the lands suitable for successful cultivation.
Id. at 615-16, 47 So. at 357. Thus, the lands underlying and adjoining practically all waterbodies in Florida, other than parcels conveyed by prior sovereigns, had passed into state
ownership by 1850.
141. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
142. Once it has acquired both the lands under navigable waters (sovereignty lands) and
the lands under nonnavigable waters (swamp and overflowed lands), "a state can set its own
navigability standard to determine what waters will be retained for the public trust." Commentary, The Public Trust Doctrine and Ownership of Florida'sNavigable Lakes, 29 U. FLA.
L. REv. 730, 738 (1977). See also MacGrady, supra note 2, at 604.
143. Even before statehood, Florida had by statute adopted the English common and
statutory law up to July 4, 1776. Act of Nov. 6, 1829, § 1. This statute remains in force today.
FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1981). The effect of such a statute is discussed in H. FARNIAM, supra note 1,
at 244. See also Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 386-87 (1891).
144. See supra note 53.
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not conclude until 1891 that the state owned the beds of all rivers navigable
in fact, whether fresh or tidal.'"
The Florida rules currently governing the determination of whether submerged land is to be regarded as sovereignty in character closely parallel
principles of federal law. In general, "a water body should be regarded as being
non-navigable absent evidence of navigability." 146 Consequently, the party
seeking to establish navigability must carry the burden of proof. If the original government surveyors meandered the waters, however, a rebuttable presumption of navigability arises, 147 requiring the opposing party to prove
145. State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 27 Fla. 276, 328, 9 So. 205, 208 (1891). As late as
1889, the Florida Supreme Court was deciding cases consistent with the English common law
rule that the beds of waters not "technically" navigable were privately owned, though subject
to a public navigational servitude. Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 19-20, 6 So. 160, 162 (1889). Apparently, the court was still undecided about which rule to adopt in Dumas v. Garnett, 32 Fla.
64, 73-74, 13 So. 464, 466-67 (1893).
The Florida Supreme Court first formulated and applied a test of navigability to determine
ownership of nontidal waterbodies in Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909). In
Broward, the court adopted the rule that state ownership is determined by a watercourse's
actual capacity for navigation in its ordinary or natural state, rather than its tidality or "technical" navigability, Id. at 409-10, 50 So. at 830. Having adopted this rule, the court subsequently accepted the corollary principle that submerged beds of waters not naturally navigable
in fact are not sovereignty lands, regardless of whether the waters are tidal or fresh, and notwithstanding that the waters had been made navigable by artificial improvements. See Pounds
v. Darling, 75 Fla. 125, 133-35, 77 So. 666, 669 (1918) (fresh waters); Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla.
109, 111-13, 58 So. 25, 26 (1912) (tidal waters and artificial improvements). The United States
Supreme Court has also held that a private pond which was made navigable by artificial
improvements at the owner's expense did not become subject to a public right of navigation,
even though it had always been tidal in character. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164 (1979).
146. Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977, 989 (1976).
147. Id. at 988-89. See, e.g., Toledo Liberal Shooting Co. v. Erie Shooting Club, 90
F. 680, 681 (6th Cir. 1898). Meandering has been described as a "process of drawing the
exact outline of a [watercourse] based on observations of its contours made while walking
around the shore." Commentary, supra note 142, at 735. Meander lines were drawn by the
original United States government surveyors, who were instructed to "accurately meander ...
all navigable rivers ...; all navigable bayous.. .; all lakes or deep ponds of sufficient magnitude; and all islands suitable for cultivation." See Lopez v. Smith, 145 So. 2d 509, 511 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1962). The federal surveyor's determination as to navigablity, once accepted by the
state and relied upon for many years, is ordinarily accepted by the courts as correct. Odom v.
Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977, 984, 988 (Fla. 1976). These surveys were relied upon by state
and federal land officials as the basis for selecting the parcels that were patented to Florida
as swamp and overflowed lands. See South Fla. Farms Co. v. Goodno, 84 Fla. 532, 540-49, 94
So. 672, 674-77 (1922).
Ordinarily, if the water is actually navigable, a grant of the upland property carries title
to the ordinary high water line, regardless of whether the meander line was located above or
below that point. The meander line may constitute the boundary, however, if: (1) the water
is not navigable in fact, see Florida Bd. of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund
v. Wakulla Silver Springs Co., 362 So. 2d 706, 712 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.
2d 1366 (Fla. 1979); (2) the waterbody is navigable, but the state cannot sustain its burden of
establishing the location of the true high water line, see id.; see also Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Wetstone, 222 So. 2d 10, 14 (Fla. 1969); or (3) the discrepancy
between the meander line and the ordinary high water line is of such magnitude as to constitute fraud or mistake, see generally South Fla. Farms Co. v. Goodno, 84 Fla. 532, 543-49, 94
So. 672, 675-77 (1922).
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otherwise. Except for waters that the legislature has classified nonnavigable
as a matter of law,'148 navigability is a question of fact based on whether the
water in its ordinary and natural condition is of sufficient size and permanence to be useful as a highway for public commercial transportation.'

49

If

this

test is satisfied, the state owns the submerged lands up to the ordinary or mean
high water line, and such lands are considered sovereignty lands held pursuant
to the public trust. The precise nature of this trust ownership, and the extent to
which the doctrine operates as a limitation upon the state's power to alienate
particular interests in the property, remains to be defined.
The 1856 Riparian Act
Florida's first legislative act concerning sovereignty lands has also been its
most thoroughly litigated. In 1856, the legislature enacted a statute entitled
"An act to benefit commerce," by which the state expressly divested itself
of all right, title and interest to all lands covered by water, lying in
front of any tract or land owned by a citizen of the United States, or by
the United States, lying upon any navigable stream, or bay of the sea,
or harbor, as far as the edge of the channel, and hereby vest the full
title to the same in and unto the riparian proprietors, giving them the
full right and privilege to build wharves . . . and to fill up from the

shore, bank or beach, as far as may be desired, not obstructing the
channel, but leaving full space for the requirements of commerce.'

148. 341 So. 2d at 982-85 (construing FLA. STAT. § 197.228 (1981)). See infra note 271 and
accompanying text.
149. Some states have adopted a more liberal test of navigability encompassing pleasure
boating as well as commercial navigation. See, e.g., Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W.
1139, 1143 (1893); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937). Florida does not
recognize mere recreational boating as sufficient navigational activity on which to predicate
state sovereignty ownership. See Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977, 986 (Fla. 1976).
Florida's test remains "similar, if not identical, to the federal title test." Id. at 988. Although
federal common law is employed to determine submerged land ownership only in a narrowly
prescribed class of cases, see supra note 130, the federal title test of navigability has served as
a model for those states which recognize sovereign ownership of all waters navigable in fact.
The basic federal title test was first formulated in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557
(1870), which established that waters are navigable in fact "when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over
water." Id. at 563. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-12 (1971).
Decisions involving navigable waters must be evaluated in light of the fact that different
definitions or tests of navigability are required for different purposes. Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 170-72 (1979). The "title" test of navigability, requiring that waters be
navigable in their "natural and ordinary condition," differs from the more expansive navigability tests used to determine federal admiralty jurisdiction or federal regulatory authority,
both of which encompass waterways made navigable through artificial improvements. United
States v. Appalachian Power Co.. 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940); Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, 526
F.2d 1302, 1305 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, a finding of navigability under one test does not dictate
a similar conclusion when another test is applied. See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S.
64, 75 (1931); Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 440 (9th Cir. 1975).
150. 1856 Laws of Fla., ch. 791.
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The earliest decisions involving the Riparian Act of 1856 recognized that by
common law the sovereign holds property rights- in submerged lands distinct
from the public rights of navigation and fishing? 5, These decisions acknowledged, however, that any title conveyed by the Act, whether held by the state
or the private grantee, is coupled with a trust for the public benefit prohibit1 2
ing impairment of public rights in the waters. ,
The nature of the title granted by the 1856 Riparian Act was initially defined through a series of decisions in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
These cases elucidated general principles fundamentally consistent with English common law: the state, as sovereign, owns all lands under the navigable
tide waters; 153 this ownership consists of the absolute proprietary interest, in
the lands, held subject to a governmental duty to protect the public rights of
navigation and fishing;25 4 the state may grant its proprietary interests subject
to the same public rights;0 5 and the state may permit the private grantee to
impair or destroy the public usages in the exercise of his proprietary rights if
the higher public interest in commerce is thereby enhanced.?' Thus, the only
lands considered to be sovereignty in character were those under tidal waters,
and the only restriction imposed on the complete alienability of such lands
was that their use could not interfere with publicnavigation and fishing, unless a conflicting use was authorized by the state for an overriding public
purpose.
With the discovery of phosphate in the beds of inland rivers around 1890,
however, state officials realized that submerged lands previously considered
worthless might be a valuable revenue source if state ownership could be established.157 In State v. Black River Phosphate Co.,158 the state sought an injunction against a company mining phosphate from the bottom 'of Black
Riyer and requested an accounting for deposits already removed, on the theory
that the river was navigable at the place in question. The phosphate company
defended on the grounds that the state had not specifically set out the basis
of its title claim nor alleged that the stream was within tidal waters.0 9 The
trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer, holding that even if the state
owned the lands under nontidal rivers, it had conveyed its rights in such
lands to the riparian proprietors under the Riparian Act of 1856.160
151.

See Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325, 836-37 (1859) (citing J.

ANGELL,

supra note 20, at

220-23).
152. Alden v. Pinney, 12 Fla. 348, 390 (1869).
153. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200, 219 (1882).
154. See Alden v. Pinney, 12 Fla. 348, 390 (1869). See also Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 19,20,
6 So. 160, 162 (1889) (where a river is not technically or prima facie navigable, its privately

owned riverbed is still subject to public right of way).
155. See Rivas v. Solary, 18 Fla. 122, 126 (1881).
156. See Sullivan v. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200, 228-29 (1882). See also Sax, supra note 10, at

488-89.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
27 Fla. 276, 9 So. 205 (1891)..
Id. at 322, 9 So. at 206.
"Entertaining this view. of the law, the court does not deem it necessary to express

any opinion upon the question as to whether or not the state owns the soil in the channels
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On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court found dispositive the state's failure to make a specific allegation of ownership.16 1 Rejecting the contention that
state ownership necessarily followed from an allegation that the stream was navigable in fact, 162 the court concluded that a specific averment of present title or
ownership was essential to the state's claim. The court reasoned that even if the
state did acquire original sovereignty title to lands under navigable fresh
waters, the proprietary rights of the state may have been conveyed before
independence by Spain or England, or afterwards by the state itself.0 3 While
this case did not finally settle the question of whether nontidal water bottoms
are sovereignty lands, it clearly recognized that proprietary interests, such as
mineral deposits, were severable from the governmental trust and subject to
alienation by the state.
Taking its cue from Black River, the legislature two months later enacted
a law asserting the state's ownership of and right to sell phosphate deposits
in the beds of all navigable waters.16 4 Significantly, the legislature expressly
provided that the law should not be applied "in cases of navigable streams,
or any part thereof that is not meandered, and the ownership of the lands
embracing which is vested in a legal purchaser."1 G5 By this language, the legislature unmistakably recognized the validity of private proprietary rights in
submerged beds acquired prior to the law.166 When the statute first came before the Florida Supreme Court, however, the significance of the provision
exempting prior interests was overlooked. Although the court acknowledged
of rivers and streams in which the tide does not ebb and flow, though in fact capable of
navigation." Id.
161. Id. at 325, 9 So. at 207.
162. Id. at 325-26, 9 So. at 207. The state argued that its ownership as sovereign extended
to "the entire beds of all navigable streams within her borders, and all valuable deposits
therein, whether the waters thereof were fresh or salt, and whether the tides of the sea
ebbed and flowed therein or not .... " Id. at 323, 9 So. at 206. In opposition, the phosphate
company maintained that these rights belonged to the riparian landowners, either by virtue
of the English common law rule adopted in Florida, or under the Riparian Act of 1856. Id.
163. Id. at 327-28, 9 So. at 207-08.
164. 1891 Fla. Laws, ch. 4043. The act established a Board of Phosphate Commissioners
having the power to contract with private persons for exclusive rights to mine the phosphate
deposits. Their contracts could not grant rights for a period longer than five years, nor encompass an area exceeding "ten miles by the course of said stream.
... Id. § 4. Persons
mining without a contract, unless "mining under a bona fide claim of ownership of said
phosphate deposits," could be prosecuted for a misdemeanor, or sued by the Board. Id. § 5.
The provisions of this act are thoroughly examined in State ex rel. Peruvian Phosphate Co.
v. Board of Phosphate Comm'rs, 31 Fla. 558, 12 So. 913 (1893).
165. 31 Fla. 558, 563-68, 12 So. 913, 915 (1893). On the significance of meandering, see
supra note 147.
166. This category certainly included pre-statehood grants by Spain or the United States.
The reference to meandered areas, however, suggests another possible class of grants that
were intended to be confirmed. Since the state had not asserted ownership of nontidal waterbodies until 1890, the beds of inland streams and lakes were not considered prior to that
time to be sovereignty lands. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. If thought to
be owned by the state at all, they were regarded as "swamp and overflowed" lands, see supra
note 140 and accompanying text, which had been placed under the control of the Board of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund in 1854. 1854-55 Fla. Laws, ch. 810.
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that the legislature had the power to grant rights to phosphate deposits, 167
it inexplicably concluded that the statute's "theory and policy are inconsistent with a property right or ownership therein by others, either under the
Riparian Act of 1856 ...or otherwise."' 168
Even after the court declined to view the phosphate law of 1891 as a legislative acknowledgment of pre-existing private proprietary rights, it could
still be argued that the Riparian Act of 1856, if applicable to inland navigable
rivers, operated to vest in a qualified riparian landowner the state's title to
the submerged lands from the shore to the channel, including its recentlyasserted right to the underlying phosphate deposits. When this defense was
asserted by the same company in State v. Black River Phosphate Co. (Black
River 11),169 however, the majority concluded that the 1856 Act was not intended to vest such proprietary rights in the grantee until the lands were actually filled in and "relieved of the trust."'' 70 By reading the specific legislative
language permitting a grantee to wharf out and fill in to benefit commerce
as a limitation on the rights conveyed, the court held that the grant was merely
171
conditional.
On the other hand, Black River II conceded that the Act vested in riparian
landowners a sufficient interest to prevent the state from granting the same
phosphate rights to others. 72 The court further stated that once the lands are
filled pursuant to the statute, the proprietor's ownership is no longer subject
Although the Trustees in 1891 had no authority to sell sovereignty lands, they did have
the power to dispose of swamp and overflowed lands. See, e.g., Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535,
566-73, 112 So. 274, 284-87 (1927). But see Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co., 108 Fla. 46,
74-76, 146 So. 249, 258-59 (1933) (the Trustees' determination that the lands are of a character subject to their statutory power of sale is not prone to collateral attack). In fact, the
Trustees' "whirlwind campaign" to sell public lands resulted in an 1881 sale of four million
acres at $.25 per acre, and ultimately left the state with less than five percent of the public
lands it had received through federal grants. See Note, supra note 99, at 604 n.51. Thus, it is
plausible to assume that the legislature, not wishing to disturb established titles through
retroactive application of a new rule, intended to protect the rights of what were, at the time,
legal purchasers from the Trustees. Particularly would this be true as to unmeandered areas,
where no deductions of acreage were made for submerged lands either in the government
patents and Trustees' deeds, or on the tax rolls. See, e.g., Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d
977, 980 (Fla. 1976).
167. State ex rel. Peruvian Phosphate Co. v. Board of Phosphate Comm'rs, 31 Fla. 558,
570, 12 So. 913, 916 (1893).
168. Id. at 568, 12 So. at 915.
169. 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893). Unlike the 1891 case, however, the court treated the
stream as being "both tidal and navigable in fact..,.." Id.
170. Id. at 115, 13 So. at 650. This rationale made it immaterial whether the Riparian
Act, if interpreted as an absolute grant, "would create any beneficial right in the contents
of the soil beneath the sea, in so far as such contents could be used or availed of without
impairing the public use of such waters .... 32 Fla. 108, 13 So. at 648.
171. Id.at 108-15, 13 So. at 648-50.
172. Id. at 112, 13 So. at 650. Although the majority later insisted that this was not "a
grant of any property right," the United States Supreme Court has recently observed that the
right to exclude others is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property ... Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979).
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to the trust.'"3 In effect, then, the majority accepted the principle that both
the state's proprietary interests and the governmental powers may be alienated
by appropriate legislation, notwithstanding dictum suggesting that the public
4
trust doctrine severely restricts legislative power to convey sovereignty lands.1
It was this dictum, rather than the actual holding, which found its way into
many subsequent opinions as an expression of Florida law.
Florida'sPublicTrust Doctrine: The
Early Trend Toward Inalienability
The first comprehensive statement of Florida's modern public trust doctrine
appeared in State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing.15 The state challenged Gerbing's
claim of an exclusive right. to plant oysters in certain shallow "salt marsh
lands" deeded to him by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund as
swamp and overflowed lands.176 The trial court dismissed the proceeding upon
finding that the lands, although below the mean high water line of the navigable Amelia River, were outside the channel and were therefore swamp and
overflowed lands, not part of the river bed.a"' The supreme court reversed,
concluding that the land below the mean high water line was not swamp and
overflowed land, but rather sovereignty land which the Trustees then had no
statutory authority to convey.?18 As a result, Gerbing had no legal basis to
support his claim of exclusive rights. 79
Adopting the broad dicta of Illinois Central and Black River II, the court
173. 32 Fla. 113-14, 13 So. at 650.
174. Id. at 92-106, 13 So. at 643-48. This dictum was taken almost verbatim from the
majority opinion in Illinois Central. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
175. 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908). Justice Whitfield, who wrote for the majority in
Gerbing, authored most major Florida Supreme Court decisions involving navigable waters
and the public trust doctrine in the early twentieth century, and thus significantly influenced
the development of Florida law in this area. E.g., Adams v. Elliott, 128 Fla. 79, 174 So. 731
(1937); Perky Properties, Inc. v. Felton, 113 Fla. 432, 151 So. 892 (1934); Trumbull v.
McIntosh, 103 Fla. 708, 138 So. 34 (1931); Freed v. Miami Beach Pier Corp., 93 Fla. 888, 112
So. 841 (1927); Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927); Apalachicola Land & Dev.
Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923); City of Tarpon Springs v. Smith, 81 Fla. 479, 88
So. 613 (1921); Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919); Panama Ice & Fish Co. v.
Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry., 71 Fla. 419, 71 So. 608 (1916); Ex Parte Powell, 70 Fla. 363, 70 So.
392 (1915); Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912); Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee,
62 Fla. 549, 57 So. 428 (1912); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909); Ferry Pass
Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48
So. 643 (1909); State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908).
176. 56 Fla. at 606-07, 47 So. at 354. On the origin and evolution of the Trustees as the
principal agency exercising authority over Florida's state-owned lands, see Note, supra note
99, at 603-07.
177. 56 Fla. at 607-08, 47 So. at 355. The basis for the referee's conclusion was not disclosed.
178. ld. at 615-16, 47 So. at 357. See supra note 166.
179. Id. As an alternative to his ownership claim, Gerbing defended on the basis of an
1881 statute that authorized the county commissioners to grant exclusive oyster planting
rights in the public waters of the state. 1881 Fla. Laws, ch. 3293. The court rejected this
contention because the river contained natural oyster beds, which were expressly exempted
and reserved for free public use by the 1881 act. 56 Fla. at 612-14, 47 So. at 356-57.
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declared that the state held navigable waters not as ordinary property to be
sold into private ownership, but for the public uses of navigation, commerce,
and fishing.180 This public character imposed an implied legal duty on the
state to preserve and control the navigable waters and subjacent lands. Although the state could permit limited ownership or use of sovereignty lands
where public rights would not be materially impaired, general control over
the waters could not be abdicated. 81
Having laid this foundation, the court delivered the classic statement of
Florida's public trust doctrine:
The trust with which these lands are held by the state is governmental, and cannot be wholly alienated. For the purpose of enhancing and,
improving the rights and interests of the whole people, the state may
by appropriate means grant to individuals the title to limited portions
of the lands, or give limited privileges therein, but not so as to divert
them from their proper uses, or so as to relieve the state of the control
and regulation of the uses afforded by the land and waters.8 2
Elaborating upon those interests the state could alienate, the court endorsed
granting limited privileges to aid navigation or commerce, or to encourage
new industry and the development of resources. 8 3 The court suggested that
the exterior areas of a river beyond the point of useful navigation might, be
subject to conveyance, but it emphasized that the state's interests in sovereignty lands could be alienated only to the extent those interests do not "unreasonably" or "substantially" impair public rights, and then only pursuant
to legislative authority.' 8
The Gerbing concept of the public trust doctrine represented a shift away
from the common law treatment of governmental and proprietary interests
in navigable waters. On the premise that ownership of the land was essential
to control of the waters, 8 5 this public trust theory perceived the bundle of
sticks as relatively indivisible, and the apportionment of public and private
rights as a choice between absolutes. By declaring that the state could grant only
limited portions of the lands or such privileges therein as would not substan180. 56 Fla. at 615, 47 So. at 357.
181. Id.
182. ld. at 612, 47 So. at 356. Although the majority cited Illinois Central as authority,
it clearly modified Justice Field's dictum in significant respects. For example, Illinois Central

emphasized that the public trust doctrine would not "sanction the abdication of the general
control of the state over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a

sea or lake." 146 U.S. at 452-53 (emphasis added). Gerbing simply declared that "[t]he states
cannot abdicate general control over such lands and the waters thereon..... 56 Fla. at 609,
47 So. at 355 (emphasis added).
183. 56 Fla. at 612, 47 So. at 356. The Gerbing majority undoubtedly was aware that the
1856 Riparian Act and the 1891 phosphate legislation had been judicially- approved.

184. Id. at 613, 47 So. at 356-57. See, e.g., Symmes v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co., 64
Fla. 480, 483-84, 60 So. 223, 224-25 (1912) ("Mhe acquisition of such property is not of

common right, but depends upon proper legislation and authorized appropriopra [sic] action
duly taken thereunder.'.
185. 56 Fla. at 615, 47 So. at 357. This was the same misconception that had given birth
to the public trust doctrine in American law. See supra notes 68, 83 and accompanying text.
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tially impair public interests protected by the trust or interfere with riparian
rights,1s6 Gerbing largely discounted the fact that property interests in the
submerged bed could be held apart from, but still subject to, those servitudes.
In theory and in practice, the prohibition against private ownership of lands
under navigable waters which were useful for public purposes or subject to
riparian rights would assure that title to sovereignty lands remained in the
state.
While Florida courts were restricting the state's power to alienate sovereignty lands, the legislature was becoming increasingly active in providing
for their disposition.' 5 ' A 1913 statute vested title to all islands, sand bars,
and shallow banks in the tidal waters of Dade and Palm Beach Counties in
the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund. 8 8 By 1917, this statute was
extended to include the entire state.18 9 These acts, which marked the first
attempts to vest a state agency with authority to convey sovereignty lands,
were soon challenged as a violation of the public trust.
In Brickell v. Trammell,90 a riparian landowner on Biscayne Bay claiming
title to an island under the Riparian Act of 1856 challenged the Trustees'
power to sell the island pursuant to the 1913 legislation. Avoiding the issue
of the Trustees' authority, the Florida Supreme Court further restricted the
public trust to allow only the grant of limited privileges in sovereignty lands."'
The court concluded that the 1856 Riparian Act conveyed no title to lands
below the high water mark, but merely granted an easement to wharf out or
fill in to the channel's edge.' 92 The legislature promptly signaled its disapproval
of this narrow interpretation by adopting the Riparian Act of 1921, reconfirming the statutory rights of riparian owners originally granted in the 1856
legislation.' 9' Thus, by the early 1920's, a confrontation had developed be186. In Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 410, 50 So. 826, 830 (1909), the court observed
that title to lands under navigable waters "passes subject to the public easements and to the
riparian rights allowed by law." This thought was somewhat superfluous in light of the
rule which already restricted alienability to those limited areas where public rights would
not be substantially impaired.
The appearance of riparian rights as a limitation on the alienability of sovereignty lands
probably reflected the fact that the court had recently examined the subject of riparian rights
in Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 57
Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909). In Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918),
the court held that the common law rights of a riparian proprietor include "the right of
ingress and egress to and from the lot over the waters . .. and that of unobstructed view
over the waters, and in common with the public the right of navigating, bathing, and fishing," but not the right to wharf out and fill in from the shore to the channel. Id. at 59,
78 So. at 501. Riparian rights were held to constitute property which could not be taken
without just compensation. Id. at 76-77, 78 So. at 506.
187. This tension was not atypical. See Sax, supra note 10, at 547.
188. 1913 Fla. Laws, ch. 6451.
189. 1917 Fla. Laws, ch. 7304. See Note, supra note 99, at 604-06.
190. 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919).
191. Id. at 559-60, 82 So. at 226.
192. Id. at 570, 82 So. at 230. In a further departure from the common law, the court
declared that "[t]itle as against the public cannot be acquired by adverse possession." Id.
193. 1921 Fla. Laws, ch. 8537 § 1. The 1921 Act, which was made retroactive back to 1856,
contained language similar to the 1856 Act, except that it applied to all riparian proprietors
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tween the legislative acts, which attempted to confer private rights in sovereignty lands, and the judicially-created trust doctrine, which refused to recognize the validity of such conveyances. This conflict could ultimately be resolved only by a determination of the extent to which the public trust doctrine
operated as a limitation upon the legislative power.
The TransitionalPeriod:Recognitionof
LegislativeAuthority to Alienate
Sovereignty Lands
The Florida Supreme Court's movement toward a theory of absolute inalienability halted in State ex rel. Buford v. City of Tampa.9 4 The legislature had by special acts granted the City of Tampa all state-owned sovereignty
lands under Hillsborough Bay and the Hillsborough River. 95 In 1924, the city
conveyed the submerged lands to a private individual so that the property
could be developed into a private residential subdivision. 9 The attorney
general then brought suit to invalidate the conveyances as violative of the
public trust. 197 Despite a lengthy dissent, the court upheld the legislature's
power to grant title to sovereignty lands, declaring that Florida had no constitutional provision prohibiting such alienation, and that "[w]hatever trust
was imposed was that of the common law."'198 The majority concluded that no
express constitutional authorization was required to empower the legislature
to dispose of sovereignty lands. 99 Buford thus confirmed that the public trust
owning to the high water mark; expressly made the grant "subject to any inalienable trust
under which the state holds said lands"; and provided that the grant of title was not effective

until the lands were "actually filled in or permanently improved." Id. The validity of the act
was upheld in State ex tel. Buford v. City of Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 210-11, 102 So. 336, 340-41
(1924). See also Commodore's Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, 3 F.2d 841, 844-45 (S.D. Fla.
1925).
194. 88 FIa. 196, 102 So. 36 (1924).
195. 1899 Fla. Laws, ch. 4882; 1913 Fla. Laws, ch. 6781.
196. 88 Fla. at 204, 102 So. at 339.
197. Id. at 205, 102 So. at 340.
198. Id. at 207, 102 So. at 340.
199. Id. at 210, 102 So. at 341. Although his general philosophy had been rejected,
Justice Whitfield continued his efforts to fashion judicial principles that would preserve the
state's sovereignty lands against private claims. In Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274
(1927), decided with the concurrence of three circuit judges sitting in place of three disqualified justices, Whitfield attempted to reaffirm or establish several important principles relating to grants of public lands which encompassed some sovereignty lands: (1) that because
lands under navigable waters passed to the state under the equal footing doctrine in 1845,
federal grants of swamp and overflowed lands after 1850 could not include any sovereignty
lands, id. at 566, 112 So. at 284; (2) that since the Trustees had no authority to convey
sovereignty lands through their deeds of swamp and overflowed lands, neither the description
in such a deed nor the subsequent exercise of ownership rights could give the grantee title to
lands below the ordinary high water line, id. at 567, 112 So. at 284; (3) that title to submerged lands exposed by artificial lowering of the water did not vest in the grantee, because
the bed "remained sovereignty lands when the water receded," id.; (4) that the grantee of
swamp and overflowed lands deeded by the Trustees before an official survey was conducted
took the unsurveyed lands subject to the boundaries subsequently fixed and "with notice that
the conveyance of swamp and overflowed land does not in law cover any, sovereignty lands,"
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doctrine does not absolutely bar alienation of state interests in sovereignty
2 00

lands.

Subsequently, in Pembroke v. PeninsularTerminal Co., 20 1 the court upheld
legislation authorizing the Trustees to sell sovereignty lands against the contention that such acts were either prohibited by the state constitution or in
conflict with the public trust doctrine. 2 Having upheld the Trustees' statutory power to grant sovereignty lands, the court rejected arguments that the
retained governmental powers over the lands constituted a title encumbrance
sufficient to warrant rescission of the sale contract. 20 3 The court concluded that
the Trustees' deed conveyed a fee simple title subject at most to the state's
police power and the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 04
With this decision, the court brought the public trust doctrine full circle
to its modest common law origins. 20 5 In effect, Pembroke recognized that the
state may freely alienate its proprietary interests in lands under navigable
waters, 20 6 subject only to retained governmental powers to regulate for the
id. at 570, 112 So. at 285-86; and (5) that the grantee of swamp and overflowed land could
not become the owner of the inadvertently included sovereignty land through the doctrine of
"after-acquired title," id. at 573, 112 So. at 287.
Although some of these statements were overruled or qualified in later decisions, one significant feature that merits attention here is that when a submerged bed becomes dry, it remains sovereignty land. Implicit in this principle is a recognition that, although the public
rights in the waters are terminated, some interests in the lands are still held by the state.
Since the beneficial uses for which the trust was created are no longer present, only the
proprietary rights remain, and thus there is no longer any reason to treat the lands as
sovereignty lands. This concept is consistent with Florida's treatment of filled lands. See supra
text accompanying note 173 and infra note 211 and accompanying text.
200. The holding in Buford was reaffirmed in Tampa N. R.R. v. City of Tampa, 104
Fla. 481, 140 So. 311 (1932), where the court upheld the validity of a similar grant from the
City of Tampa to a private entity. The city sought to avoid the conveyance some 20 years
later for lack of consideration, but the majority found ample consideration in the company's
commercial development of the property. Id. at 485, 140 So. at 313. See also Bryant v. Lovett,
201 So. 2d 720, 724 (Fla. 1967). But see Sax, supra note 10, at 504.
201. 108 Fla. 46, 146 So. 249 (1933).
202. Id. at 68, 146 So. at 256. The Pembroke court observed that "a state has full power
to legislate concerning the disposition and use of navigable waters and the lands thereunder,"
subject only to the federal power to regulate interstate commerce or to any state constitutional limitations. Id. (emphasis added). The 1917 statute, discussed supra note 188 and
accompanying text, authorized the Trustees to sell submerged tidal lands "upon which the
water is not more than three feet deep at high tide and which are separated from the shore
by a channel or channels, not less than five feet deep at high tide." FLA. STAT. §§ 1061-62
(1920). Since some areas qualifying for sale under the statute would undoubtedly be of significant public usefulness, but no limitation was placed on the quantity of lands subject to
conveyance, the act was manifestly irreconcilable with the public trust philosophy espoused
in the earlier opinions of Justice Whitfield.
203. 108 Fla. at 77-92, 146 So. at 259-64.
204. Id. at 88-89, 146 So. at 263. By equating the state's retained governmental interest
with the police powers, the court foreshadowed the demise of the jus publicum as a separate
stick in the bundle of rights comprising the totality of interests in sovereignty lands. See infra
notes 315-21 and accompanying text.
205. See Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 798 (Fla. 1957) ("In our democracy the State's
title is in the nature of the sovereign proprietorship as it existed at common law.").
206. In a succession of cases after Pembroke, the court consistently upheld the power
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public benefit. These retained governmental "sticks" neither diminish the
fee simple character of the state's grant nor encumber the grantee's right to
exploit his proprietary interest in any manner consistent with the public rights
in the waters.
The absolute nature of the grantee's title to sovereignty lands was fortified in Holland v. Fort Pierce Financing& Construction Co. 207 A private company had acquired title to sovereignty land by bulkheading and filling to the
channel pursuant to a general grant under the 1921 Riparian Act. Subsequently, the legislature by special act attempted to vest the Trustees with
the title and authority to sell the filled sovereignty land.203 When the company
sought to prevent a sale by the Trustees on the ground that the special legislation constituted a deprivation of private property, the Trustees challenged
the company's title under the Riparian Act. 209
In resolving the conflict between the statutes, the court ruled that the 1921
Riparian Act constitutionally alienated sovereignty lands, 210 and that the
riparian owner's title to those lands, once filled, became "absolute and equal
to that of the upland." 21' The court rejected the Trustees' contention that
such legislation was necessarily inconsistent with the public trust, explaining:
"[]f the grant of sovereignty land to private parties is of such nature and extent as not to substantially impair the interest of the public in the remaining
lands and waters it will not violate the inalienable trust doctrine." 212 The
court decided that the company's title, once perfected under the Riparian Act,
could not be divested by subsequent legislation; instead, the public's use of
the waters "must yield to the paramount proprietary right of the riparian
213
owner."
of the legislature to control the disposition and exercise of rights in sovereignty lands.
A statute authorizing the Txustees to grant permits for the construction of public recreational facilities was approved in Hicks v. State ex rel. Landis, 116 Fla. 603, 607-08, 156 So. 603,
604 (1934). In Adams v. Elliott, 128 Fla. 79, 174 So. 731 (1937), the court recognized that although the primary uses of beaches were for public swimming and recretation, a statute authorizing the use of the beach as a public highway "is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of
the state in the premises." 128 Fla. at 87, 174 So. at 734. In Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342, 20
So. 2d 388 (1945), the court upheld the authority to lease oil and gas rights in sovereignty
lands even without public notice. The legislature's grant of authority to allow the Trustees
to sell sovereignty lands was actually praised by the majority in Caples v. Taliaferro, 144
Fla. 1, 7, 197 So. 861, 863 (1940).
207. 157 Fla. 649, 27 So. 2d 76 (1946).
208. Id. at 652,27 So. 2d at 78.
209. Id. at 652-53, 27 So. 2d at 78-79.
210. Id. at 656-57, 27 So. 2d at 80-81. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
211. 157 Fla. at 656, 27 So. 2d at 80. This ruling settled the confusion arising out of the
prior decision in Trumbull v. McIntosh, 103 Fla. 708, 138 So. 34 (1931), where Justice
Whitfield had mistakenly held that the statutory rights "vested in the owner of the upland
at the effective date of the statute" and that "[flilling in and improving gave no new title to
the submerged land." Id. at 712, 138 So. at 35 (emphasis added). Ironically, an earlier federal
court decision had correctly interpreted the act as a conditional grant under which the
riparian proprietor acquired title only when the lands were bulkheaded and filled in. Commodore's Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, 3 F.2d 841, 845 (S.D. Ila. 1925).
212. 157 Fla. at 657-58, 27 So. 2d at 81. See also Hayes V. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799
(Fla. 1957).
213. 157 Fla. at 658, 27 So. 2d at 82. On this point, the Florida court, adopted a position
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Under Holland, once the state has determined that the exercise of private
proprietary rights in a specific parcel or an entire category of sovereignty lands
will not substantially impair the public interests in the remaining lands and
waters, and has conveyed such rights pursuant to legislative authority, both
the state and the public must honor the grantee's vested proprietary interests.
The juxtaposition of this perception of the public trust against that of the
Gerbing opinion reflects a swing of the ideological pendulum from one extreme
to another during the two intervening decades. The court moved from a restrictive view recognizing state authority to grant only limited parcels of sovereignty land, to a liberal approach acknowledging virtually absolute legislative authority to alienate the whole bundle of sticks. At both extremes, the
court treated the ownership issue in terms of absolutes.
1
The 1962 case of Gies v. Fischer2
4 ultimately defined the contours of the
relationship between private proprietary interests and retained governmental
powers in sovereignty lands. In Gies, private persons who had purchased submerged land in Boca Ciega Bay from the Trustees challenged the "Bulkhead
Act," which authorized local officials to fix a bulkhead line across their property and to prevent filling beyond that line.2 15 After holding the Bulkhead Act
applicable to both private and publicly owned sovereignty lands, the court
found that the prohibition against filling into the area of the public navigational servitude did not constitute a deprivation of the grantee's proprietary
interest; rather, it was merely an exercise of the retained governmental power
to which his ownership was necessarily subject. The majority reasoned that
a conveyance of sovereignty lands, while vesting in the purchaser all of the
grantor's rights of use and control, would, in the absence of "overriding necessity," be invalid if it actually impaired the public servitudes. 21 8 The landowners had no right to fill beyond the point of the public servitude before the
statutory restriction, so the fixing of a bulkhead line merely prevented them
from doing what they could not lawfully have done beforehand. Consequently,
the court concluded that the legislation could be "sustained as police regulation or an exercise of retained power under the trust doctrine governing
21
sovereign lands."

7

directly contrary to that taken by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central, 146
U.S. at 455, 460-61.

214. 146 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1962).
215.

The statute empowered the local governing body to establish a line "beyond which

a further extension creating or filling of land or islands outward into the waters . . . shall be
deemed an interference with the servitude in favor of commerce and navigation with which
the navigable waters of this state are inalienably impressed." Id. at 362 n.2. 1957 Fla. Laws,
ch. 57-362. The "Bulkhead Act" also repealed the Riparian Act of 1921. Id. § 9. See, e.g.,
Helliwell v. State, 183 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966). In attacking this provision, the landowners contended that the statute "could not lawfully authorize the establishment of a
bulkhead line, for any reason, upon submerged lands to which [they] hold title by deraignment from a duly confirmed conveyance from the trustees ...." 146 So. 2d at 363.
216. 146 So. 2d at 363. The court also recognized that, as to areas which had already
been filled, "the doctrine of estoppel . . . may further bolster title," and might operate "to

cut off all residual public rights, or create a conclusive presumption that any subsequent
impairment be corrected only by exercise of the power of eminent domain ...." Id.

217.

146 So. 2d at 363.
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Gies confirms that the state can sever proprietary interests in submerged
lands and grant them to private owners without sacrificing its inherent governmental power to protect and preserve public easements in the waters. The
opinion equates the jus publicum with the police power, and strongly suggests
that except for retained governmental interests, a conveyance by state officials
will effectively vest rights in the grantee to the same extent as a deed between
private paties. The Gies court also conceded that the filling of submerged
lands may, through estoppel, eliminate residual public rights, or create a conclusive presumption that public interests were not initially impaired, so that
an exercise of the eminent domain power would be required to correct any
subsequent impairment of those interests. 218 The majority indicated that
rights conveyed by the state may constitute private property, which cannot be
recovered without payment of just compensation.
The just compensation issue came to the surface in Zabel v. Pinellas County
Water & Navigation Control Authority.29 In Zabel, other private owners of
submerged land in Boca Ciega Bay who had acquired title from the Trustees
.before the Bulkhead Act contested the denial of permission by local authorities
to fill their subaqueous property. The supreme court emphasized that the
landowners' right to bulkhead and fill, although subject to reasonable regulation under the police power, was a valuable property right expressly granted
in the conveyance from the Trustees. 22 0 Since that conveyance was presumed
to be a valid grant based upon a determination that the public interest would
not be impaired, the court placed the burden of showing a change of conditions, to the extent that the exercise of the right to fill would adversely affect
the public interest, on the objecting parties rather than the grantee. 22 1 Consequently, because it was not established that the proposed filling would materially and adversely affect the public interest, the court held that denial of
222
the permit constituted a taking of property without just compensation.
218. Id.
219. 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965).

220. Indeed, the majority later commented that the statutory rights to bulkhead and fill
are the "only present rights attributable to ownership of the submerged land itself." Id. at

381. The statement is puzzling when juxtaposed with language from Gies and earlier decisions
concerning the extent of proprietary rights conveyed by the state's grant. Properly, it should
be observed that the grant carries with it all interests which are not inconsistent with the
public rights, such as the right to mineral deposits. See, e.g., Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342,
20 So. 2d 388 (1945); State ex rel. Peruvian Phosphate Co. v. Board of Phosphate Comm'rs,
31 Fla. 558, 12 So. 913 (1893); State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 27 Fla. 276, 95 So. 205

(1891).
221.

171 So. 2d at 380. The majority opined:

Conceding... that, under certain conditions, a police power regulation could, by pro-

hibiting filling or dredging, deprive the owner.of any valuable use of his property, it is
clear that such regulation can be valid only if a material adverse effect specified by the
legislature is proven. Such regulation, absent proof of an overriding public necessity,
constitutes the taking of private property without just compensation.

-Id. at 379-80 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 381. Undoubtedly, the adoption in 1968 of a constitutional provision embodying the public trust doctrine was attributable in part to Zabel. FLA. CoNsT.art X, § 11.
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Zabel in effect elevated the proprietary interests of the state's grantee to
a level of parity with the state's governmental powers by requiring the state
to demonstrate an overriding necessity for exercising governmental power before private rights can be taken without compensation. The decision would
appear to have undermined the basic precept of the public trust doctrine, that
private interests in sovereignty lands must remain subject to the exercise of
governmental power for the protection of public rights. A close reading, however, reveals that Zabel was predicated more on the notion that the Trustees'
initial determination that the grant was not adverse to the public interest
worked a kind of estoppel, which prevented the state from subsequently asserting a contrary position, absent a change of circumstances.
The rationale of Gies and Zabel revealed a new perspective on private
rights in sovereignty lands by suggesting that the grantee's title could be
equated with the ownership of nonsovereignty land; that the retained governmental trust power could be equated with the police power; and that the state
could be estopped from exercising its authority to prohibit the grantee's use
of the property without payment of just compensation. These concepts, clearly
irreconcilable with traditional public trust philosophy, constituted the raw
materials from which courts constructed contemporary Florida law.
The Emergence of Estoppel Principles
Even before Gies and Zabel, the Florida Supreme Court had established
that the state could be estopped, by long acquiescence and collection of taxes,
to deny the validity of technically defective prior deeds purporting to convey
public lands.2 23 The court in Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v.
Claughton224 applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the state to

quiet title to sovereignty lands that had been filled, but never purchased from
the Trustees. 225 Rejecting the contention that application of this doctrine
would improperly transfer public rights held in trust, the court concluded
223. See Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1950). Estoppel doctrines are designed to
ensure fairness where strict application of the law would yield unseemly or unjust results.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Bolen, 149 Fla. 377, 5 So. 2d 690, 693 (1942). The use of estoppel principles
in the adjudication of rights in sovereignty lands had been foreshadowed by Perky Properties,
Inc. v. Felton, 113 Fla. 432, 151 So. 892 (1934). On the distinction between ordinary "public
lands" and sovereignty lands, see State ex rel. Town of Crescent City v. Holland, 151 Fla. 806,
10 So. 2d 577, 587-90 (1942).
224. 86 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1956).
225. The property at issue was a 20.7 acre island in Biscayne Bay. Although five acres of
the island had been validly purchased as sovereignty lands from the Trustees, the remaining
acreage had been added through the deposit of spoil from a federal dredging operation in an
adjacent channel. Id. at 777-82. The filling had been authorized by the City of Miami, but
the sovereignty land on which the filling was done had never been purchased from the
Trustees. The landowners contended that the original purchase of the five-acre parcel of
sovereignty land entitled them to bulkhead and fill the adjoining bottomland under the
1921 Riparian Act. Id. at 782. The court rejected this theory, however, finding that the right
to fill granted by the riparian acts did not apply to grants of sovereignty lands; a grantee of
sovereignty lands could fill the acreage actually deeded by the Trustees, but only a purchaser
of riparian uplands was given the statutory authority to fill the contiguous submerged lands.
Id. at 787-89.
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that estoppel could be invoked even against the state's sovereignty interests
provided it did not interfere
when necessary to prevent manifest injustice,
226
with the exercise of governmental power.

Despite broad language, Claughton did not imbue the doctrine of equitable estoppel with sufficient force to divest the state of all interests in all
sovereignty lands. The court merely ruled that since the state can convey its
proprietary rights in the same manner as do private landowners, equitable
estoppel should operate as it would against any, other landowner. 2 27 By cautioning that the doctrine cannot interfere with the exercise of governmental
rights which the
power, the court limited the application of estoppel to those
2
state could have expressly granted to the private claimant. 28
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean229 employed a similar rationale in applying legal estoppel to defeat the state's claim in a parcel
of sovereignty land mistakenly sold by the Trustees through a concededly
void deed. The Trustees attempted to sell the same land again on the theory
that the void deed was ineffective to convey sovereignty lands, but the court
held that the Trustees were legally estopped by having purported to deed
lands which they had authority to convey. 230 Inferentially, to the extent that
the state could sell the land, its interest could be divested by the same legal
principles that applied to private landowners.2 3 1 In a special concurrence
joined by all the court's participating members, Justice Drew stressed that when
the state engages in the business of selling land, a nongovernmental function,
232
it is subject to the same rules and regulations that apply to private citizens.
226. 86 So. 2d at 789-90.
227. Id. at 792.
228. It was possible in Claughton to hold that equitable estoppel operated to quiet title
absolutely in the private landowner, subject only to the same police powers that are applicable to all property, because the case actually involved only sovereignty lands which had
been filled and thereby relieved of the trust. See supra text accompanying note 170. See also
Oliphant v. State, 381 Mich. 630, 637, 167 N.W.2d 280, 283 (1969) (court rejected state assertion that it continued to own a trust interest in filled and developed submerged lands, and"
noted that the lands, once filled, "lost their value for such trust purposes.").
229. 127 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1961). As the distinction was explained in Claughton, legal
estoppel "exclude[s] evidence of the truth and the equity of the particular case to support a
strict rule of law, on grounds of public policy," while equitable estoppel prevents a party
from asserting rights when his conduct determines it would be against equity and good
conscience. 86 So. 2d at 791 (quoting Horn v. Cole, 51 N.H. 287, 291 (1868)).
230. 127 So. 2d at 103. The court clearly indicated, however, that legal estoppel precludes a party from repudiating its facially valid deed, regardless of whether that party at
the time of the deed actually had authority to convey the property. Id. at 102. The court
suggested that the doctrine of "after-acquired title" could operate to vest sovereignty lands
in a grantee who had received a deed from the Trustees purporting to convey a different
kind of public lands at a time when they had no statutory authority to grant sovereignty
lands. Id. See Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976), confirming Lobean's statement-and thus overruling statements to the contrary in Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So.
274 (1927). See supra note 199.
231. 127 So. 2d at 102. The court acknowledged a limitation on the estoppel doctrine by
noting that "[t]he authority of the Trustees to sell said lands is at all times subject to the
various trusts named in the act" Id. at 103.
232. Id. at 104 (Drew, J., concurring). Accord Oliphant v. State, 81 Mich. 630, 167
N.W.2d 280 (1969).
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By employing this reasoning, the court for the first time approved a divestment
of the state's title to lands actually submerged under navigable waters by a
conveyance not conforming with prescribed legislative authority.
The court subsequently defined the outer limits of Claughton and Lobean
by ruling that estoppel doctrines could not be invoked to create title, but
only to "bolster a paper title" from the state. 233 The application of equitable

principles to divest the state of its ownership interests in sovereignty lands,
however, was predicated not on the claimant's possession of paper title,234 but
on the state's conduct concerning the lands and its purpose in pursuing the
claim. 235 At the very least, Claughton and Lobean establish that when a pri-

vate person receives paper title to sovereignty lands from the state, even if
the deed is technically void for purporting to convey a different class of lands,
state acquiescence in the exercise of private rights on the land may warrant
3
the invocation of estoppel to quiet the grantee's title.2 6
The retreat from the rule that sovereignty land could pass into private
ownership only pursuant to valid legislative authorization was accelerated by
implicit reliance upon estoppel principles in Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Wetstone.23 7 In Wetstone, the Trustees had issued a deed of
swamp and overflowed lands, which actually encompassed some lands beneath
navigable waters, prior to obtaining statutory authority to convey sovereignty
233. Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1970) (where a strip of sovereignty land
had suddenly emerged after a hurricane, the adjoining riparian landowners did not acquire
title through equitable estoppel merely by paying taxes on the property). But see J. POMEROY,
3 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 802, at 180 (5th ed. 1941), stating that the "practical effect" of
equitable estoppel is "to create and vest opposing rights in the party who obtains the benefit
of the estoppel."
234. In an effort to distinguish Claughton, which involved lands that had been filled but
never deeded by the Trustees, the majority in Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1970)
suggested that because the disputed parcel had been statutorily granted to the City of Miami
before being quitclaimed back to the Trustees, it was "not sovereignty but city-owned land."
Id. at 838. Since it is clear that Claughton had never obtained a paper title to the filled land,
the majority was apparently trying to establish that the title which was divested by equitable
estoppel was not the state's. Yet the title had been quitclaimed back to the Trustees by the city
at the time of the decision, and the majority itself acknowledged that the doctrine operated
to "cut off" certain residual state interests. If the characterization was intended to imply that
the Trustees were not holding title as "the state," it ignores the fact that all lands held by
the Trustees are by statute state-owned. See FLA. STAT. § 253.03(1) (1981). In reality, the key
difference between the two cases is that in Claughton, the title to the land had been conveyed by the state (to the City of Miami) and the land had been raised by deliberate filling,
which the state could have prevented; in Peppe, the title had never left the government's
control. Thus, the critical factor was not that the landowners did not have a paper title
emanating from the state, but that the state had acted like a proprietor in Claughton by
intentionally divesting itself of the land and allowing its character to be altered, while in
Peppe the state had never dealt with the land in anything other than a purely governmental
capacity.
235. Conduct is the principal basis of equitable estoppel. J. POMEROY, supra note 233, at
§ 802, at 180.
236. See Commentary, supra note 142, at 741-43 (criticizing the use of estoppel to divest
state sovereignty land titles). See also City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 423, 476 P.2d 423 (1970).
237. 222 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1969).
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lands.235 The grantee claimed that his title, as described in the deed, extended t6
the meander line of the original government survey, even though the meander
line was located as far as a quarter mile offshore beyond the mean high water
line. Paying lip service to the rule that sovereignty lands cannot be conveyed
without lawful authority, 239 the court held that where the Trustees have deeded
lands to private grantees, then subsequently contend a portion of the property
was beneath navigable waters, the state has the duty and burden to establish
the true boundary between the sovereignty lands and private uplands. 240 Because the Trustees had failed to locate the mean high water line, the court
implicitly ascribed an estoppel effect to the deed and ruled that the meander
line constituted the boundary. 241 The practical result of the judgment was to
divest the sovereignty lands lying between the true mean high water line and
242
the meander line from the state and to quiet title in the Trustees' grantee.
Another variation of the estoppel theory has been suggested as a means of
divesting the state of sovereignty lands when an artificial lowering of the water
table exposes previously submerged sovereignty lands.243 Although -a change
in a navigable lake's ordinary high water line precipitated by unnatural or
unlawful causes would not ordinarily transfer ownership of any exposed sovereignty land from the state to a private riparian owner, the court noted
that "[a]cquiescence or failure by the State to restrain an artificial lowering
of the water table for a long period might constitute laches or estoppel .
4.4.
238. Wetstone's deed was issued by the Trustees in 1905, but the Trustees did not
acquire the power to sell the disputed sovereignty lands until 1917. Id. at 12. See also 1917
Fla. Laws, ch. 7804.
289. See, e.g., Pierce v. Warren, 47 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1950); Martin v. Busch, 98 Fla. 525,
112 So. 274 (1927); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 898, 50 So. 826 (1909); State ex rel. Ellis v.
Gerbing, 56 Fla. 608, 47 So. 258 (1908).
240. 222 So. 2d at 18.
241. Id. at 14.
242. This point was stressed in a lengthy dissent by Chief Justice Ervin, who concluded
that the majority's result effectively overruled Martin v. Busch. Id. at 14-19 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting). See supra note 199. Nonetheless, the Wetstone principle has consistently been followed. See State of Florida Bd. of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.
Charley Toppino & Sons, 514 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1975); State Bd.-of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Laney, 899 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1981); Florida Bd. of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Wakulla Silver Springs Co., 862 So. 2d
706 (3d D.CA. 1978), cert. denied, 868 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1979).
248. State v. Florida Nat'l Properties, Inc., 338 So. 2d 18, 18-19 (Fla. 1976).
244. Id. at 18-19. The court also held that the legislature could not constitutionally enact
a law fixing specific and permanent boundaries between sovereignty lands and riparian uplands, since an inflexible boundary would deprive the landowner of his riparian right to
future alluvion or accretions, and thus amount to a taking of his property without just
compensation. Id. at 17. The act invalidated in Florida National Properties, FLA. STAT.
§ 253.151 (1975), was designed to settle the extent of state ownership in Florida's meandered
fresh water lakes by providing a statutory method for establishing the boundary between the
submerged beds, which were to be designated as a separate class of sovereignty lands, and the
riparian uplands. The legislature's reliance on meandering as the criterion for determining
state ownership was reminiscent of the earlier phosphate legislation, see supra notes 165-67
and accompanying text, and would later be read as evincing a legislative intent to treat nonmeandered lakes as subject to private ownership. See Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977,
982-85 (Fla. 1976); see also infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
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The court implied that the state has an affirmative duty to monitor activities
that might affect its title to sovereignty land and that the neglect of its duty
may operate to divest the state of such title. This dictum fits squarely in line
with the trend toward assessing the state's legal rights by the same standards
245
applicable to private persons.
The Marketable Record Title Act: Merger
of Statutory and Judicial Doctrines
The trend toward desanctification of state interests in sovereignty lands
has continued, despite inclusion of the public trust doctrine in the 1968 Florida
Constitution246 and the concurrent emergence of the environmental movement
as a political force. In 1969, the legislature completed the process begun in
1913247 by granting the Trustees authority to sell all classes of state-owned
sovereignty lands. 2 48 A more significant development, however, was the judicial recognition of the Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA) as a means
of confirming private titles in alleged state-owned sovereignty lands.24 9
Although enacted in 1963, MRTA was not considered in a submerged
lands case until 1973. In Sawyer v. Modral,250 Sawyer sought to enjoin Modrall
and the public generally from, navigating across a portion of the intracoastal waterway covering land to which Sawyer claimed title under an 1890

245. See, e.g., City of Eustis v. Firster, 113 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1959).
246. FLA. CONsr. art. X, § 11 provides:
Sovereignty lands. The title to lands under navigable waters within the boundaries of
the state, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water
lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of
such lands may be authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private use
of portions of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not contrary to the
public interest.
Id. Before a 1970 amendment, adopted under a legislative proposal, H.J.R. RES. 792 (1970),
the last two sentences were joined so that both sales and private use of sovereignty lands could
be permitted when "not contrary" to the public interest. See Note, supra note 99, at 599 n.23.
This constitutional provision has been characterized as a confirmation of Florida's common
law public trust doctrine and an acknowledgment that some sovereignty lands had in fact
been alienated by the state. Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977, 981, 987 (Fla. 1976).
247. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
248. 1969 Fla. Laws, ch. 69-'308, § I amended FLA. STAT. § 253.12, to include the title to
navigable fresh water lakes, rivers, and streams. Prior to the 1969 amendment, § 253.12 provided that title to state sovereignty lands "[e]xcept submerged lands heretofore conveyed by
deed or statute, and submerged lands in navigable freshwater lakes, rivers and streams" were
vested in the Trustees.
249. FLA. STAT. ch. 712, enacted by 1963 Fla. Laws, ch. 63-133. See, e.g., Starnes v. Marcon
Inv. Group, 571 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1978); Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976);
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Paradise Fruit Co., 414 So. 2d
10 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982); State Dep't of Natural Resources v. Contemporary Land Sales, Inc.,
400 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981); State Bd. of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund v. Laney, 399 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981); Sawyer v. Modrall, 286 So. 2d 610
(4th D.C.A. 1973), cert. denied, 297 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1974).
250. 286 So. 2d 610 (4th D.C.A. 1973), cert. denied, 297 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1974).
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deed from the Trustees. 251 Sawyer contended that the original deed vested
fee simple title in him since there was no express reservation of rights or
interests in favor of the state. 52 Addressing the effect of MRTA on Sawyer's
claim, 25 3 the district court focused on the Act's operative provision declaring
void any private or governmental interest based on transactions that occurred
prior to the ro6t of title'254 except rights reserved by the federal or state government in the original patent or deed. 255 The court read this provision literally and concluded that MRTA required an express reservation by the state
of its interests in sovereignty lands. 258 Since the 1890 deed contained no explicit reservations, Sawyer had clear title to the submerged land. 255 The Florida
Supreme Court denied certiorari over a vigorous dissent.258
In effect, the Sawyer court viewed MRTA as a manifestation of legislative
intent to place the state on the same footing as a private landowner when
251. 286 So. 2d at 611. Sawyer also sought damages for trespass resulting from a slight

encroachment of Modrall's seawall onto Sawyer's submerged property.
252. 1885 Fla. Laws, ch. 3641, and 1889 Fla. Laws, ch. 3995, required the Trustees to
convey nearly 350,000 acres of land to the Florida Coast Line Canal & Transportation Company. The title to Sawyer's parcel originated in the 1890 deed which was executed pursuant
to those acts. 286 So. 2d at 611, 613.

253. Although the district court initially determined that Modrall was precluded from
collaterally attacking the Trustees' deed, it proceeded "in the interest of a complete exposition of all the appeal facets" to address the "refrained dispositive issue" of whether the
Marketable Record Title Act "operated to quiet plaintiff's title" to the sovereignty lands in
dispute. 286 So. 2d at 611-12. The court's treatment of the standing issue reflects a lack of
sensitivity to the distinction between governmental and proprietary interests. In prior decisions prohibiting collateral attacks on Trustees' deeds, the third party was asserting a
personal interest. See Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co., 108 Fla. 46, 73-74, 146 So. 249,
257-58 (1933). See also Morgan v. Canaveral Port Authority, 202 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1967); Conoley v. Naetzker, 137 So. 2d 6, 8-10 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962). Sawyer, by contrast, sought to vindicate a public right protected by the trust doctrine. 286 So. 2d at 611.
254. FA. STAT. § 712.04 (1981). Interests pre-dating the root of title will not be ex-

tinguished if a notice of claim has been filed within 30 years. See id. § 712.05. "Root of title"
is defined as "the last title transaction to have been recorded at least 80 years prior to the time
when marketability is being determined." Id. § 712.01(2). The courts have given an exparsive
interpretation to this concept, holding not only that an instrument in a chain of title arising
out of a void deed could constitute a root of title, see, e.g., Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 224
So. 2d 743, 750 (4th D.C.A. 1969), cert. discharged, 236 So. 2d 114, 120 (Fla.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 964 (1970), but that the root of title itself may be a "wild" deed. City of Miami v. St.
Joe Paper Co., 864 So. 2d 439, 447 (Fla. 1978),, app. dismissed, 441 US. 939 (1979).
255. FLA. STAT. § 712.04 (1981). The court also found that none of the six enumerated
exceptions to the act set forth in § 712.03 was applicable. 286 So. 2d at 613. It is noteworthy
that the court did not consider relevant the exception for easements or servitudes in use.
FLA. STAT. § 712.03(5) (1981). A seventh exception, exempting state title to sovereignty lands,
was added in 1978. See infra note 306.
256. 286 So. 2d at 613. The court specifically rejected the contention that the proviso
was intended to include "implied state governmental reservation of title to sovereign lands,"
holding instead that "the statute should be interpreted so as to require an explicit reservation on the state's part." Id.
257. Id. at 614.
258. 297 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1974). In the dissent, Justice Ervin argued that MRTA should
not impart validity to deeds of sovereignty lands which were "illegal" at the time of their
.
execution. Id. at 562-66 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
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dealing with sovereignty property, by abrogating the rule that deeds of public
property are subject to an implied reservation of the state's title to lands under navigable waters. 2 5 9 If this interpretation meant that MRTA could operate
to divest the state of proprietary rights in sovereignty lands, the decision
comports with prior judicial recognition of the same policy.26 0 On the other
hand, if the court was ruling, as the result seems to suggest, that public easements in the waters could be terminated by operation of the Act, it dearly
went too far.

2

0

1

Any lingering uncertainties about the legislature's power to alienate the
governmental interests in lands under navigable waters were resolved when
sovereignty lands became subject to the protection of the Florida Constitution
in 1968. The constitutional provision basically embodies the common law
public trust doctrine,26 2 prohibiting the legislature from divesting the state
of the governmental power and duty to protect the jus publicum, except where
such action is affirmatively determined to be in, or at least not contrary to,
the public interest.23s Thus, wholesale curtailment of governmental powers
under a general law like MRTA is clearly impermissible. 26 4 Since Sawyer
involved only a dispute between private parties over title to the submerged
land, however, the court did not address the Act's effect on the state's govern2

mental powers.

65

259. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
261. See Note, supra note 57, at 387 ("the grantee of the jus privatum takes title just as
absolutely as under a conveyance from a private individual, but the jus publicum cannot be
abdicated or granted."). It is clear that the controverted lands were beneath the waters of the
intracoastal waterway, and that Modrall as well as other members of the public had operated
boats in these waters. The district court did not rule that Sawyer was entitled to an injunction against such "continuous entry," however, but held only that he had a valid title
which conferred standing to assert the claim. 286 So. 2d at 611.
262. See supra note 246.
263. There is no specific definition of what constitutes the "public interest." See Note,
supra note 123, at 305 ("Total reliance upon judicial decisions to define the elements comprising the 'public interest' may create a distorted perception of the applicable limits to the
trust theory.").
264. Because MRTA became law before the constitutional sovereignty lands provision
was adopted, there may be questions concerning retrospective effect and vesting of rights. If,
however, the constitutional provision merely "confirmed" common law principles, as suggested in Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977, 981 (Fla. 1976), then governmental powers
could not have been alienated in any event. The only effect of timing, if any, would be that
state proprietary rights which had not become vested in a private claimant by virtue of the
Act before 1969 may be subject to question. In 1969, the Trustees were given the power to
sell any sovereignty lands, including those under fresh water rivers and lakes, if determined
to be "in the public interest," but only after complying with specific statutory procedures
which include mandatory publication of notice of intent to sell and, if objections are submitted, a public hearing. 1969 Fla. Laws, ch. 69-308, codified as FLA. STAT. § 253.12 (1969).
Since article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution specifically required such legislative
authority, the 1969 act would seem to supersede the 1963 Marketable Record Title Act to
the extent of curtailing future divestment of state title to sovereignty lands except by valid
deed from the Trustees in compliance with the provisions of FLA. STAT. ch. 253.
265. The absence of the state or the Trustees as parties made the decision technically
binding only on the private litigants. See Perky Properties, Inc. v. Felton, 113 Fla. 432, 439-40,
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The only circumstance under which MRTA might affect state governmental powers would be to bolster fee title in sovereignty lands under waters
which have been filled, reclaimed, or otherwise rendered useless to the public.
The Florida Supreme Court addressed this situation in Odom v. Deltona
Corp.,206 and combined Sawyer's construction of MRTA with estoppel principles to forge a new multifaceted framework of analysis for sovereignty land
disputes. At issue in Odom was the ownership of certain nonmeandered fresh
water lakes which were being altered by Deltona Corporation in the development of two residential communities. 267 Deltona sought to enjoin the exercise
of state regulatory jurisdiction on the ground that it had acquired fee simple
title to the property through uninterrupted chains of conveyances, of record
for over thirty years, which originated in federal patents or in deeds of swamp
and overflowed lands from the Trustees. 26 The property descriptions in the
government patents and deeds, none of which contained express reservations
of rights, had included submerged lands, and Deltona or its predecessors had
paid all taxes assessed on the property. In opposition to Deltona's claim, the
Trustees asserted that the lakes were navigable and, consequently, the submerged beds were state-owned sovereignty lands that could not validly have
been conveyed through the post-statehood federal patents or pre-1969 Trustees'
29
deeds. 6
In a lengthy and detailed order, the trial judge rendered summary judgment for Deltona, 270 initially holding that nonmeandered fresh water lakes
which had been conveyed into private ownership by the state without an
express reservation of public rights were statutorily classified nonnavigable
as a matter of legislative policy, and therefore the lake beds were not stateowned sovereignty lands.2 ' The court also ruled that MRTA confirmed the
151 So. 892, 895 (1934); Lopez v. Smith, 145 So. 2d 509, 522 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962). Arguably,
the court's entire discussion of the Marketable Record Title Act was unnecessary because
Modrall's lack of standing to challenge the deed offered an independent ground for reversal.
See supra note 253. Alternatively, since the trial court's judgment was premised on the finding
that at the time of the conveyance sovereignty land was not legally alienable by the Trustees,
the court could have held that whatever authority the Trustees lacked was supplied by the
specific legislative acts directing issuance of the deed. See supra note 252 and accompanying
text.
266. 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976).
267. Id. at 979. For a thorough study of the legal status of Florida's fresh water lakes,
see Maloney & Plager, Florida'sLakes: Problems in a Water Paradise, 13 U. FLA. L. Rlv." 1
(1960); Commentary, supra note 142, at 730.
268. 341 So. 2d at 979. Although the precise dates of the original conveyances are not
provided, the trial court's order notes that most of the government patents and deeds were
executed before the turn of the century, but some were issued as late as 1952. Id. at 980.
269. Id. at 980.
270. The trial court's order is republished in the supreme court's majority opinion. Id.
at 979-87.
271. Id. at 982-85. The trial judge relied principally upon two statutes for this conclusion.
FLA. STAT. § 197.228 (1975), specifically provided that "navigable waters" would not include
any lakes, ponds, swamps or overflowed lands which had previously been conveyed into private
ownership by the federal or state government without reservation of public rights in the
waters, and that the beds of nonmeandered lakes conveyed by the Trustees without reservation would be subject to private ownership if the grantee held title and paid taxes for fifty
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plaintiff's title, extinguishing the Trustees' claim of sovereignty land status. 27 2
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the order granting summary judgment for Deltona; significantly, however, it did so without ever deciding
whether the lakes were in fact navigable.2 73 Although the trial court declared
the lakes nonnavigable as a matter of law based on the absence of meandering,
the majority recognized that navigability is a question of fact, 27 - and that
the absence of meandering creates only a rebuttable presumption of nonnavigability.275 Since the Odom majority necessarily concluded that the issue of
navigability was immaterial,276 the legal principles upon which the court relied are equally applicable whether the lands were in fact sovereignty or nonsovereignty in character.
The legal foundation of the majority opinion in Odom rests upon three
years. Id. This provision was enacted in 1953 as part of a taxation act, and had previously
been construed to be merely "a guide for the benefit of tax assessors," not intended as a
renunciation of title to state lands. McDowell v. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund,
90 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 1956). The other statute, § 253.151, was the same provision that was
subsequently invalidated by the supreme court in State v. Florida Nat'l Properties, Inc., 338
So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976). See supra note 244. The trial court did not rely on these statutes as an independent basis for quieting title in Deltona, but used them as evidence of a legislative intent
to establish "certain conclusive presumptions and limitations of claims" and to "settle uncertainties of status of certain fresh water areas in which private owners have muniments of
title purporting to confer valid unconditional ownership." 341 So. 2d at 984. The harmless
nature of the trial court's reliance on the invalid statute was confirmed by the supreme court
on appeal. Id. at 989.
272. 341 So. 2d at 985. The trial court specifically ruled that Sawyer "is dispositive adversely of the contention of defendant that claims of sovereignty are not extinguished by the
operation of this Act." Id. at 985-86. The trial court also held that the criminal penalty for
filling, dredging, or pumping in navigable waters without a state permit was unconstitutional
because the term "navigable" is too vague a standard for defining criminal conduct. Id. at 987.
273. Although the majority opinion by Justice Boyd was adopted by a 4-3 vote, only
Justice England dissented from the result of the decision. Justice Sundberg authored an
opinion, joined by Justice Overton, in which he dissented only from those portions of the
decision holding the Marketable Record Title Act effective to divest the state of sovereignty
land and approving the trial court's disposition of the Attorney General's counterclaim to
abate a public nuisance. Sundberg's opinion is analyzed infra in text accompanying notes
297-305.
274. 341 So. 2d at 988. The court also indicated that navigability at the time Florida
became a state "must be determined under federal standards of navigability ...." Id. This
statement warrants qualification. While the federal title test must be applied to determine
what lands passed under the equal footing doctrine in an ownership contest between the
federal government and a state, wholly intrastate disputes such as Odom are governed by
the state's own navigability test. See supra note 130. In any event, no navigability test was ever
applied in Odom.
275. 341 So. 2d at 988-89. But see FLA. STAT. § 197.228 (1981). Like the Florida Legislature,
Congress has acknowledged by law that "'lands beneath navigable waters' does not include
the beds of streams ... if such streams were not meandered . . . and if the title to the beds
of such streams was lawfully patented or conveyed by the United States or any State to any
person." The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(f). See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S.
121 (1967).
276. Since Florida law strictly prohibits summary judgment unless it is clear that "there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c), the navigability issue must have been
deemed immaterial.
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distinct grounds. First, the court adopted Sawyer's unarticulated reasoning that
the legislature's enactment of MRTA made it "logical" to insist that the
state must operate under the same rules as its citizens. Accordingly, the court
held that the Act extinguished the Trustees' claim to lands under navigable
waters which had previously been conveyed.2 7 7 Because some of the government deeds were executed as late as 1952, however, MRTA alone was inadequate to resolve the entire controversy.278 The court therefore reinforced its
result by invoking the doctrines of legal and equitable estoppel. 279
In holding that legal estoppel was applicable to bar the Trustees' ownership claim, the majority reasoned:
Stability of titles expressly requires that, when lawfully executed land
conveyances are made by public officials to private citizens without reservation of public rights in and to the waters located thereon, a change
of personnel among elected state officials should not authorize the government to take from the grantee the rights which have been conveyed
previously without appropriate justification and compensation. If the
state has conveyed property rights which it now needs, these can be
reacquired through eminent domain ....
28 0
Similarly, the court decided that because public officials had acquiesced in
Deltona's development and thereby induced reliance on the apparent lack of
any state claim, equitable estoppel prevented the state from renouncing actions
28
taken by earlier officials. '
The court's antipathy toward the state officials' renunciation of their predecessors' conveyances was further reflected in its treatment of the rule that a
grantee of unsurveyed swamp and overflowed lands takes with notice that
the deed impliedly reserves sovereignty lands which the Trustees at the time

277. 341 So. 2d at 989. In this instance, unlike Sawyer, the Trustees were participating
litigants, and thus became bound by the ruling.
278. Id. at 980. Indeed, there is some doubt as to whether any conveyance dated after
1958 could constitute a "root of title" effective to divest the state of its interests in sovereignty
lands. See supra note 264. This does not prevent a landowner from "tacking" his ownership to
an earlier "root of title" to establish a chain exceeding 30 years in length before 1968; it

merely means that those sovereignty lands not deeded out by the government in some form
prior to 1938 could not be divested solely by virtue of MRTA.
279. One commentator has suggested that the court's "shotgun approach" may be attributable to "its recognition of the weakness of each of the [three] arguments when viewed
individually and a belief that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts." See Commentary, supra note 142, at 749. This observation overlooks the possibility that no single

one of the three bases would have been sufficient to dispose of the entire case. Due to the
necessity of a 30-year chain of title, MRTA would not apply to the more recent deeds. Under
Peppe, estoppel would not preclude the Trustees from asserting title to those lands which
had been acquired by Deltona through federal patents rather than state deeds. Moreover, it
is at least equally plausible that the court was deliberately engaging in a bit of "overkill" to
register its disapproval of the state's conduct.
280. 341 So. 2d at 989 (citing Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Lobean,
127 So. 2d 98, 104 (Fla. 1961)).
281. Id. (citing Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Claughton, 86 So. 2d 775,
790 (Fla. 1956)).
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had no authority to convey. 2s2 The Odom court acknowledged the applica28- 3
bility of this rule in cases where the body of water is obviously navigable,
but recognized that the doctrine is limited both by the inherent difficulty of
determining whether a small watercourse is navigable 2 14 and by the actions
5
of state officials after a survey has been conducted. In effect, the Odom majority combined the presumptive effects of meandering with estoppel principles to resolve the Trustees' notice of navigability argument. Under this reasoning, a grantee of unsurveyed land takes
with notice that any of the described property shown by the subsequent survey to be under navigable waters could not be included in the deed.2s6 When
the survey is later conducted, however, the surveyor's failure to meander the
watercourse creates a rebuttable presumption of nonnavigability, 2 7 so the
land is presumably nonsovereignty and the implied notice principle is no
longer in force. If the state accepts the surveyor's judgment, the grantee is
entitled to rely upon these official acts and may exercise the ordinary incidents of ownership over the lands.288 Eventually, the state will be estopped by
its acquiescence from asserting any interests not expressly reserved in the deed.
It was through this reasoning, rather than by examining the lakes' actual
navigability, that the court found the lands to be privately owned and not
subject to public rights. 2 9 By denying the state's right to regulate Deltona's
282. Id. at 988. The principal authority for this rule was Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535,
112 So. 274 (1927), discussed supra note 199. The Trustees asserted in Odom that "since
Florida became a state in 1845 [they have] held title to sovereign lands beneath the navigable
waters of Florida, particularly those beneath fresh navigable waters .... " 341 So. 2d at 988.
Although it is true that the lands under navigable waters vested in the state as of 1845, see,
e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 83 (1931), the Trustees did not acquire statutory title
to lands under fresh navigable waters until 1969. See supra note 248.
283. 341 So. 2d at 988. Florida courts have applied the so-called "notice of navigability"
doctrine only in cases involving grants of unsurveyed land adjoining concededly navigable
waterbodies. Pierce v. Warren, 47 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1950) (Biscayne Bay); Martin v. Busch, 93
Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927) (Lake Okeechobee).
284. 341 So. 2d at 988. The court also upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the penal
provisions of the regulatory statute at issue were unconstitutional because the term "navigable" is excessively vague. Id. at 990. See supra notes 6 & 272.
285. "[Ait this late date we are not in a position 'to evaluate the work of those surveyors
of many decades past' and can merely accept their work as correct, particularly since the state
itself has relied upon it constantly since it was completed." 341 So. 2d at 988.
286. See supra note 199.
287. 341 So. 2d at 988-89. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. Conversely, meandering creates a rebuttable presumption of navigability. Thus, if the waterbody is meandered, the
lands are presumed to be sovereignty lands, and it is the grantee's burden to offer evidence in
rebuttal if he wishes to establish a private claim to the submerged land as against the state.
288. In rejecting the Trustees' attempt to contest the correctness of the original surveys,
the trial court in Odom observed that "governmental conveyances were made in reliance on
[the surveys] and the grantees had the right to assume the U.S. government and the Trustees
were acting lawfully." 341 So. 2d at 984.
289. 341 So. 2d at 989. See, e.g., Osceola County v. Triple E Dev. Co., 90 So. 2d 600, 602
(Fla. 1956) (private ownership of nonnavigable inland lakes is absolute and not subject to
any public fishing or boating rights). On the right to use nonnavigable lakes in Florida, see,
e.g., Silver Blue Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Assoc., Inc., 245
So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1971); Sunney Isles Ocean Beach Co. v. Benke, 126 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1961); Florio v. State ex rel. Epperson, 119 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1960).
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dredging and filling operation, the majority seemingly held that MRTA and
estoppel principles taken together can annul the state's governmental authority, as well as its proprietary interest. Yet the opinion also suggested that the
state can reacquire through eminent domain any property rights neded to
290
enforce its regulations.
The key to unraveling this apparent inconsistency in the majority opinion
lies in the court's discussion of state police power, together with the fact that
state officials had already acquiesced in some modification of the lake bottoms. 2 91 The court had earlier recognized that the state's power to preserve
the public navigational servitude over privately owned submerged lands could
be sustained either as a regulation under the police power or as an exercise
of the retained governmental interest under the public trust doctrine.2 2 In
Odom, the majority observed that while the state "has the inherent police
power to enact such standards and regulations as may be necessary for the
public interest relating to the use and development of all public and private
water areas, . . . this state regulation must be accomplished in a constitutionally permissible manner." 293 In effect, the Odom court simply recognized
that the state's governmental interest in sovereignty land is subject to. the
same constitutional limitations as the state's police power. Certainly, the state
could exercise its police power to halt Deltona's development, but only with
proper justification and upon payment of just compensation. 294
Odom did not hold that MRTA itself terminated the state's governmental
interest in sovereignty lands; it merely recognized that the state could not
use its retained governmental interest to destroy private proprietary rights
which had vested in its grantee by virtue of the Act and had been exercised
without objection from the state in a manner that only later was determined
to be contrary to the public interest. The court acknowledged the state could
require private owners to obtain permits before altering submerged lands, 29 but found the imposition of such a requirement unreasonable after the state
had acquiesced in Deltona's operations.296 Thus, MRTA extinguished only
the Trustees' claim to proprietary ownership of the submerged lands; the
state's governmental power was forfeited by its own conduct.
In a separate opinion, 297 Justice Sundberg found it "inconceivable" that
290.

341 So. 2d at 989.

291. Id.
292.

See Gies v. Fischer, 146 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1962), discussed supra notes 214-18 and

accompanying text.
293. 341 So. 2d at 987 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 989.
295. Id. at 987.
296. Id. at 989.
297.

Id. at 990 (Sundberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Joined by

Justice Overton, Sundberg concurred in the application of legal and equitable estoppel to
confirm Deltona's ownership, but echoed the dissenting views expressed by Justice Ervin in
Sawyer concerning the effect of MRTA. Id. at 990-91. Justice Sundberg also dissented from
the majority's decision "insofar as it approves an adverse judgment against the Attorney
General upon his counterclaim" to abate Deltona's operations as a public nuisance. Id. at
991-92. Since the trial court had simply declined to dispose of that issue, however, the
majority did not actually approve an adverse judgment against the counterclaim; it merely
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the legislature could divest public trust lands through a general act without
requiring an affirmative determination that each grant was not contrary to
the public interest. 298 Unless it is regarded strictly as an attack on the wisdom
of MRTA, however, this argument necessarily rests upon two assumptions:
that governmental power to protect public rights in navigable waters depends
upon state ownership of the beds; and that the Act itself operates to terminate
the state's governmental interest in sovereignty lands. These assumptions overlook the established relationship between the state's proprietary interests and
its retained governmental power under the trust doctrine.
The public trust doctrine focuses on the state's duty and power to preserve
the public servitudes in navigable waters, which cannot be alienated so long
as the waters remain susceptible to such use. Yet, the line of decisions from
Pembroke through Gies established that private ownership of the submerged
lands does not necessarily impair the exercise of governmental power to protect public servitudes in the waters. 299 Courts have consistently permitted the
legislature by general law to grant private rights in sovereignty lands to the
exclusion of public interest- without requiring an assessment for each parcel
of the effect on those public interests. 00 Since the Florida Constitution did
not limit legislative power in this regard until 1968, the validity of MRTA
as a statutory basis for divesting the state of its ownership interests in sovereignty lands could hardly have been questioned at the time of its enactment. 3 1
Once the Act vested those proprietary interests in the private landowners,
of course, they could not be subsequently taken by the state without com2
pensation or proof of an overriding public necessity.30
Nonetheless, MRTA did not, and could not of its own force, deprive the
state of the retained governmental power to prevent any exercise of proprietary rights actually interfering with the public servitudes. The legislature
could not divest the state of its governmental power over navigable waters,
3
The private
just as it could not contract away the state's police powers. 02
landowner whose deed contained no express state reservations of proprietary
interests, however, was entitled to exercise all "rights of use and control normally accompanying title," subject to the state's inherent power to protect
observed the general policy of not considering questions that were not passed upon by a
lower court.
298. Id. at 990.
299. "[P]ublic rights in navigable waters generally are well recognized, and private ownership of the bed is not inconsistent with public rights in the use of the water." F. MALONEY,
S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 61 (1968). See also infra note 319
and accompanying text. Even Justice Ervin conceded that "public rights arising incident to
the navigable character of a waterbody . . . are not theoretically inconsistent with the fact
that the bed of the waterbody may be privately owned." Silver Blue Lake Apartments, Inc.
v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Assoc., Inc., 245 So. 2d 609, 617 (Fla. 1971) (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
200. Illustrative of these statutes are the Riparian Acts of 1856 and 1921. See supra notes
150-52 & 193 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 246 & 264.
302. Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigational Control Authority, 171 So. 2d 376,
379-80 (Fla. 1965).
303. See, e.g., Tampa N. R.R. v. City of Tampa, 91 Fla. 241, 107 So. 364, 365 (1926).
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the public use of the water.3 04 If the landowner engaged in activities jeopardizing public rights, the state could intervene and prevent further damage. If
the state permitted the landowner's conflicting use to* proceed without protest, however, it could not subsequently reverse its position and deprive the
individual of the fruits of his labor, at least not without appropriate justification and compensation.305
Odom therefore stands for the proposition that MRTA operates to vest
in a grantee of sovereignty lands, whose chain of title extends back at least
to 1958,306 the right to exercise all proprietary interests in the lands.3 0 7 If the
1

804. Gies v. Fischer, 146 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1962).
805. 341 So. 2d at 989. The United States Supreme Court has taken the same position
with respect to the federal navigational servitude. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164 (1979), the Court held that the acquiescence of the Corps of Engineers in Kaiser Aetna's
dredging of a pond as part of a residential development precluded a subsequent assertion of
the navigational servitude in the waters without compensation to the developer.
While the consent of individual officials representing the United States cannot "estop"
the United States .... it can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies that, if
sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes over
the management of the landownersproperty .... And even if the Government phys-

ically invades only an easement in the property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation.
Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Of course, if the waters were filled in to
become dry land, all public rights in the waters would be severed, and the retained governmental trust power would terminate. E.g., State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13
So. 640, 650 (1893).
306. In 1978, the legislature limited the effect of Odom by amending the Marketable
Record Title Act so as to exclude from its operation "[s]tate title to lands beneath navigable
waters acquired by virtue of sovereignty." 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-288, codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 712.03(7) (1981). Although the Florida Supreme Court has recently declined to address the
question whether the 1978 amendment operates retrospectively, Askew v. Sonson, 409 So. 2d
7, 8-9 (Fla. 1981), other Florida appellate decisions have confirmed that retroactive application of the amendment would be unconstitutional, and that since there was no legislative
expression of intent for retroactive application, this new exception has only prospective effect.
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Paradise Fruit Co., 414 So. 2d
10, 11 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982); Laney v. State Bd. of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Trust Fund, No. 79-1192, Final Summary Judgment at 7 (16th Cir. Ct. June 80, 1980), aff'd,
899 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981). See also State Dep't of Natural Resources v. Contemporary Land Sales, Inc., 400 So. 2d 488, 492 &n.4 (Fla. 5th D.C.A:. 1981).
307. The extent of the landowners freedom under the trust is appropriately described
by an informal opinion of the California Attorney General:
The owner of lands subject to the public trust may use the property as he sees fit, subject
to the power of the State to abate (prevent or remove) any nuisance or illegal obstruction
he may create thereon, and to reoccupy the lands in the event such occupation becomes
necessary for trust purposes.
San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, SAN FRANCISCO BAY PLAN SuPPLEMENT 442

(Jan. 1969). At least one state has held, however, that while the state may intervene to abate
activities which may jeopardize the navigational easement, it may not recover the value of
minerals removed from the submerged lands by the private party. State v. Korrer, 127 Minn.
60, 148 N.W. 617 (1914). Fraser explains that the use of the minerals in the land "is not part
of the common public right and could not be from its very nature." Fraser, supra note 11, at
482.
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lands have not been so altered as to destroy the navigational servitude, the
proprietary rights, although wholly owned by the grantee, continue to be held
subject to the public rights in the waters. 308 If, however, the proprietary rights
have been exercised so as to impair or destroy the navigational servitude and
the state has acquiesced in such usage, estoppel principles will preclude the
state from asserting its governmental interests to deprive the grantee of property rights acquired by his investment of labor and capital,309 in good faith
reliance on the state's failure to object, unless the state can prove an overriding necessity and provide just compensation.310 By employing MRTA and
estoppel principles in this fashion, the Odcvn court formulated a workable
method of balancing public and private rights in submerged lands. This approach yields predictable results based on considerations of fairness, thereby
obviating the uncertainties and inequities inherent in a system under which
rights are made to rest on the often obscure physical characteristics of waters
3 11
at some time in the past.
After Odom there remained one significant difference between the state's
ability to prevent impairment of public rights under the retained governmental
trust authority and the control which it could exert through police power. At
least theoretically, the state's latitude as trustee was virtually unfettered. The
exercise of police power, on the other hand, has always been circumscribed
by the constitutional prohibition against taking property for public purposes
without just compensation.3 1 2 With the decision in Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,313 the court completed the conceptual equation between the governmental trust and the general police power. Upholding the assertion of
state regulatory authority to prohibit a landowner from developing a vast
expanse of environmentally sensitive tidal wetlands, the majority concluded
that if the government intervention is designed to prevent a public harm
rather than to create a public benefit, denial of permission to alter the character or use of such property is not a compensable taking, but is a legitimate
exercise of police power.3 14 'Because the retained governmental interest under
the trust doctrine has traditionally been applied solely to prevent impairment
of or to maintain existing public rights in navigable waters, Estuary Properties essentially means there is no situation warranting the invocation of the
trust authority that would not be as readily remediable by a legitimate exercise of the police power.
308. H. FARNHAM, supra note .L,at 229.
309. See supra note 305.
310. "The private right of the grantee is always subject to the law of eminent domain, so
that the land may be taken for -public use for which it is needed upon due compensation
being made." H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at 232.
311. "[A]lthough 'navigable' is one way to describe waters subject to public protection,
a navigability criterion is not a necessary one at all for state regulation of public and private
usufructuary rights in water." MacGrady, supra note 2, at 605. The trial court in Odom
stressed the difficulty in determining past navigability. 341 So. 2d at 984.
312. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.; FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 6(a).
313. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
314. Id. at 1380-83. See generally Comment, Environmental Law: Wetlands Regulation
Prevents Harm, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 615 (1981).
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CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS

Odom and Estuary Propertiesrepresent the culmination of Florida's trend
toward "desanctifying" state ownership interests in sovereignty lands and
merging the retained governmental interest with general police powers. The
synthesis of MRTA with judicially created estoppel doctrines limited the implied reservation principle to the extent that state proprietary interests are
treated the same as individual private property rights in the contemplation
of the law.3 15 Once it was recognized that preservation of public rights in
navigable waters did not require state ownership of the underlying lands,
there was no reason to prohibit state alienation of such property; and once
the power to alienate was acknowledged, there was no reason to treat the
state differently than a private landowner dealing with ordinary real property.
The realization that the state's retained governmental power to control
the use of navigable waters is not dependent upon ownership of the submerged property has facilitated the conceptual merger of the state's public
trust authority with general police powers. It must be remembered that the
notion of a distinct governmental interest in navigable waters was the product
of an era in which virtually the only rights over the use of property that were
accorded legal recognition were those connected with some identifiable interest in the property. 316 Under common law theory, even the sovereign could
not regulate the use of property in which he held no ownership rights, at
least not without acquiring such rights through eminent domain.317
With the expansion of the state's police power in the twentieth century,
however, it came to be accepted that the use of private property could be
controlled through reasonable regulations, such as zoning.3' 8 Once it was recognized that both public servitudes in the navigable waters and private development of the underlying lands could be adequately regulated through the
police power,31 9 there was no longer any need for a distinct governmental trust
815. Cf. United States v. General Petroleum Corp., 73 F. Supp. 225, 234 (S.D. Cal. 1946)
(the government, in dealing with public mineral lands, acts in a proprietary capacity and is
to be treated as would any private landowner), affd sub nom., Continental Oil Co. v. United
States, 184 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1950). See also United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,
474-75 (1915).
816. Although some land use controls have existed for centuries in England, they were
dictated by practical considerations of economic or social necessity and were predicated upon
a correip6iiling land ownership pattern. These systems "differed from the present, where
control rests upon statutory powers conferred on public authorities who do not themselves
own the land." W. 0. Hart, Control of the Use of Land in English Law, in LAW AND LAND
5 (C.M. Haar ed. 1964).
317. See, e.g., W. LAcKsToNE, I COMMENTARMS 139. Illustrative of the narrow scope imparted to the police power in regulating the use of privately owned waterbodies is Pounds
v. Darling, 75 Fla. 125, 77 So. 666 (1918), in which the court adopted the rule. that the police
power cannot be invoked to prevent riparian owners from exercising their incidental rights
of bathing, fishing, and boating in a private lake, even though the lake was the source of a
city's water supply. Id. at 134-35, 77 So. 2d at 669,
318.'- Zoning, as such, did not exist in England or the United States until the twentieth
century. See generally J. MEZENBAUM, THE LAw OF ZONING 7-15 (2d ed. 1955),
319. "[T]he mere granting of property to a private owner does not ipso facto prevent the
exercise of the police power, for states routinely exercise a great deal of regulatory authority
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interest in sovereignty lands.3 20 Thus, when the Odom court equated the retained governmental interest with the police power, it hastened the demise of
an archaic concept which had outlived its usefulness and become a source of
321
confusion for generations of judges, lawyers, and litigants.
By placing the state's proprietary interests in sovereignty lands on an equal
ground with those of private citizens, and by replacing the governmental trust
authority with the police power, Florida courts have effectively jettisoned the
archaic and amorphous principles of the public trust doctrine in favor of a
more familiar framework of analysis. The potential benefits of applying general property law to title disputes and police power principles to regulatory
controversies are manifest. Where a legitimate public interest is threatened,
there is no need for a determination of title to the land; thus, the costs and
complications attendant to the determination of navigability are eliminated. 322
When only proprietary rights are at stake, there is no basis for the state to
assert the public trust principle as a pretext for attempting to appropriate
without compensation property rights that had, by virtue of the state's own
acts or omissions, become vested in a private party -a practice courts have
repeatedly condemned. 3 23 Instead of treating the resolution of disputes over
public and private rights as a choice between absolutes, Florida may now
achieve the balancing of public rights and proprietary interests originally intended by the trust doctrine.
Application of the governmental/proprietary distinction by Florida courts
in resolving the conflict between public and private rights in lands under
navigable waters confirms that the public trust doctrine is not concerned with
ownership of the submerged lands so long as there is no interference with the
public's right to use the navigable waters. The recognition of a severable
proprietary interest in submerged lands is consistent with both common law
precedent and common sense logic. There are many benefits that can be derived from submerged lands apart from but consistent with public rights in
over privately owned land." Sax, supra note 10, at 489. Without regard to the validity of
private titles to sovereignty lands, the public trust interests can be enforced through extensive
regulation without raising a constitutional right to compensation. Id. at 528 n.174.
320. Other states have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.38
(1964). See generally Leighty, Public Rights In Navigable State Waters-Some Statutory Approaches, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 459 (1971).
321. Odom has been welcomed by both federal and state courts as a solution to the
problem of determining relative rights in sovereignty lands. Starnes v. Marcon Inv. Group,
571 F.2d 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1978); City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 347 So. 2d 622.
624-25 (3d D.C.A. 1977), cert. discharged, 364 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1978), appeal dismissed,

441 U.S. 939 (1979).
322. See supra notes 6, 311 and accompanying text.
323. For an excellent illustration of this point, compare Oliphant v. State, 381 Mich. 630,
167 N.W.2d 280, 283 (1969) (applying estoppel where the state had conveyed lands, which
were then filled and developed, because the lands had "lost their value for . . . trust purposes" and were sought by the state only "for the purpose of enriching the central [general]
fund of the State") with People e: rel. Gazlay v. Murray, 54 Mich. App. 685, 221 N.W.2d 604,
607 (App. 1974) (refusing to apply estoppel to validate a federal patent of submerged lands
because the state's objective to prevent the landowner from filling was, unlike its purpose in
Oliphant,"consistent with holding the land in public trust.").
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the waters. It makes no sense to say such interests must be preserved, if their
preservation neither enhances nor diminishes the public rights for which the

trust was created.
Moreover, the capacity to alienate proprietary interests in sovereignty lands
is a natural concomitant of the state's function as trustee for the public's property.32' Since the state has the power to preserve the public servitudes in the
waters, it is in the interest of the state and all of its citizens to permit private
development of those resources that are not susceptible to common public
use or enjoyment. If the distinction between governmental powers and proprietary rights is properly observed, public and private rights in navigable
waters need not conflict, but may be exercised within their respective spheres
to the mutual benefit of all.
324. See Note, supra note 57, at 390.
If private persons were allowed to take the proprietary interest of the state in the beds
of fresh-water navigable streams, a greater development of the state's natural resources
would result ....
Practically, the use to which such property would be put, and the
added revenue from the sale thereof, would better accomplish the "trust" in which the
property is sometimes said to be held.
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